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Abstract 
In Canada, a person who performs an illegal act that is deemed to be the result of a 
mental disorder is eligible for the not criminally responsible on account of mental 
disorder (NCRMD) defence.  In recent years, some researchers have argued that the 
presence of psychopathy may be sufficient for an individual to be considered not 
criminally responsible for his or her actions.  As a result, the present study examines 
public opinion on this issue, as public opinion and policy change are inevitably related.  
A sample of 296 participants (224 women, 72 men) completed an online survey that 
assessed general attitudes toward the NCRMD defence, as well as perceptions of 
psychopathy as it relates to the defence.  On average, participants viewed psychopathy as 
a mental illness, yet psychopaths were not believed to be eligible for the NCRMD 
defence and they were still considered responsible for their negative actions.  Present 
findings also suggest that exposure to the types of arguments researchers have presented 
concerning a psychopath’s criminal responsibility could influence public opinion.  
Implications and suggestions for future research are discussed. 
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Introduction 
In Canada, a person who performs an illegal act that is deemed to be the result of 
a mental disorder is eligible for the not criminally responsible on account of mental 
disorder (NCRMD) defence.  In order to be considered for the defence, the mental illness 
must be deemed severe enough to impact either the defendant’s knowledge of the nature 
and quality of the act performed, or the defendant’s ability to understand the 
wrongfulness of the alleged act at the time it was performed (Criminal Code, R.S.C., 
1985, c.46, s.16).  However, a dilemma concerning the notion of criminal responsibility 
has emerged in recent years: should psychopaths be eligible for the NCRMD defence 
solely as a result of their psychopathy?  In other words, should psychopathy be 
considered a mental disorder in the eyes of the law?  Psychopaths can be violent and 
aggressive to achieve their goals, but they can also be extremely manipulative and 
masters of charm.  Not only have they been found to have a drastically negative impact 
on work productivity, interpersonal relationships, and various other aspects of society, 
they also engage in high rates of violent crime, including homicide (Babiak, Neumann, & 
Hare, 2010; Boddy, 2013).  Historically, psychopathy has not been considered a 
reasonable basis for the exclusion of the prosecution of individuals who have committed 
criminal acts (Morse, 2008).  However, some have argued in recent years that perhaps 
psychopaths should not be held criminally responsible for their illegal actions (Morse, 
2008). 
An issue that must be addressed when considering the intersection of psychopathy 
and criminal responsibility is the potential implications of deeming psychopaths not 
criminally responsible.  If psychopaths were to become eligible for the NCRMD defence, 
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there would be factors in need of consideration.  The mental health court system focuses 
on the treatment, as opposed to incarceration, of mentally ill offenders.  However, the 
question of whether or not psychopaths can successfully be treated remains largely 
unanswered and some researchers have found that certain treatments may actually lead to 
even more severe psychopathic tendencies (e.g., Rice, Harris, & Cormier, 1992).  That 
being said, simply releasing psychopathic offenders back into the public with no 
repercussions for their actions would be an undoubtedly misguided option.  Hence, the 
question remains: if psychopaths regularly become part of the mental health court system 
and are successful with NCRMD defences, how exactly will they be dealt with? 
The present study aims to examine public opinion toward psychopathy in regard 
to criminal responsibility as public opinion is inextricably related to law and policy 
change, a notion that is further discussed below.  Before the study is described in more 
detail, relevant background information is first discussed, including the history and 
current legislation of mentally ill offenders in Canada, a description of psychopathy and 
how the construct relates to the issue of criminal responsibility, and a short summary of 
attitude strength and susceptibility to change. 
Legislation and Treatment of Mentally Ill Offenders in Canada 
A brief history.  Legislation dealing with mentally ill offenders, or “insane” 
offenders, as they were known until quite recently, did not exist in Canada until the 1800s 
(Pozzulo, Bennell, & Forth, 2015).  Dealing with these “insane” offenders was 
considered a family matter.  These offenders were typically sent home and their families 
were instructed to look after them.  Eventually, two cases in Britain led to changes in the 
handling of offenders with mental illnesses in several parts of the world, including the 
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United States and, of great importance to this project, Canada (Moran, 1985). 
 The first of the two British cases was that of James Hadfield in the year 1800.  
Hadfield was caught during an assassination attempt on King George III, but he had 
previously suffered a brain injury in battle (Moran, 1985).  His lawyer argued that he was 
“insane” at the time of the offence and the court came to a verdict that this was, in fact, 
true (Moran, 1985).  Hadfield had to be set free, as there was no legislation to manage 
“insane” offenders at the time.  Many individuals were not satisfied with the freeing of 
Hadfield, as they believed that the attempted murder of a king should not go unpunished 
(Moran, 1985).  As a result, the Criminal Lunatics Act (1800) was established, which, for 
the first time, enabled the government to detain “insane” offenders who committed 
serious crimes (Moran, 1985). 
 The second important case occurred in the year 1843.  A man named Daniel 
McNaughton shot one of the then British Prime Minister’s secretaries in the back, 
resulting in his death (Moran, 1985).  McNaughton was charged with murder, but was 
found not guilty by reason of insanity (Moran, 1985).  Several criteria relevant to the 
insanity plea were outlined during this case.  It was determined that in order to be 
considered “insane” in the eyes of the court, the defendant must be found to be suffering 
from a defect of reason or disease of the mind, and the defendant must not know either 
the nature or quality of the act he or she was performing or that what he or she was doing 
was wrong (Pozzulo et al., 2015).  These constructs quickly found their way into the 
Canadian justice system.  In fact, they are still part of the NCRMD defence (Criminal 
Code, R.S.C., 1985, c.46, s.16).  The laws governing “insane” offenders changed very 
little following the case of McNaughton.  If an individual were found not guilty by reason 
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of insanity, that person would be automatically confined within an institution for an 
undetermined length of time (Ogloff & Schuller, 2001).  Unfortunately, this approach 
focused on managing the offenders, not treating them.  The system was widely regarded 
as inadequate and some people argued that detaining mentally ill individuals for an 
indeterminate amount of time was infringing on their basic human rights (Ogloff & 
Schuller, 2001). 
With a widespread dissatisfaction toward the way “insane” offenders were 
handled and the subsequent emergence of Bill C-30 in 1992, the Canadian standard 
changed (Pozzulo et al., 2015).  In this bill, Canada dropped the term not guilty by reason 
of insanity in favour of the more socially acceptable term not criminally responsible on 
account of mental disorder that is used today (Pozzulo et al., 2015).  The Criminal Code 
of Canada was amended to include the following statement: “No person is criminally 
responsible for an act committed or an omission made while suffering from a mental 
disorder that rendered the person incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the 
act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong” (Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c.46, 
s.16, p. 37).  Also, with Bill C-30 came the establishment of review boards, which were 
appointed the duty of determining the appropriate disposition for each mentally ill 
offender, as well as reevaluating each offender from time to time (Pozzulo et al., 2015).  
 Since the enactment of Bill C-30, there have been slight alterations.  For example, 
in 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that any offenders who have been 
determined not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder should not be 
detained unless they are considered a danger to the public (Pozzulo et al., 2015).  Also, 
reviews of the Canadian justice system in regard to mentally ill offenders took place in 
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2002 and 2007 with the goal of improving the legislation and making the general public 
safer, while providing mentally ill offenders with the most appropriate treatment (Pozzulo 
et al., 2015). 
The current legislation.  In order to be considered for the NCRMD defence 
today, the defendant must be found to have a mental disorder that was severe enough at 
the time to impact his or her knowledge of the nature and quality of the act performed or 
the defendant must have been unaware of the wrongfulness of the act as a result of the 
mental disorder (Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c.46, s.16).  The Criminal Code of Canada 
defines the term mental disorder as a “disease of the mind” (Criminal Code, R.S.C., 
1985, c.46, s.2, p. 8).  Justice Dickson stated in the case of R. v. Cooper (1980): 
. . .[I]n a legal sense ‘disease of the mind’ embraces any illness, disorder or 
abnormal condition which impairs the human mind and its functioning, excluding 
however, self-induced states caused by alcohol or drugs, as well as transitory 
mental states such as hysteria or concussion.		In order to support a defence of 
insanity the disease must, of course, be of such intensity as to render the accused 
incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the violent act or of knowing 
that it is wrong. (p. 1159) 
Thus, it is determined by the judge on a case-by-case basis whether a given condition is 
considered to be a mental disorder due to the broad definition of the term and a lack of 
predetermined categories for what conditions could potentially be regarded as mental 
disorders in the eyes of the law.  As a result, a wide range of conditions, including 
personality disorder (R. v. Simpson, 1977), psychomotor epilepsy (R. v. O’Brien, 1978), 
and arteriosclerosis (i.e., hardening of the arteries; R. v. Kemp, 1957), have been 
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considered diseases of the mind in past court cases. 
Before a decision is made regarding a defendant’s criminal responsibility, 
qualified personnel must first complete a full psychological assessment to determine the 
mental state of the defendant at the time of the offence (Pozzulo et al., 2015).  Typically 
included in this assessment is the Rogers Criminal Responsibility Assessment Scales (R-
CRAS; Rogers, 1984).  The R-CRAS examines five different facets: patient reliability, 
organicity (i.e., possible biological underpinnings to abnormal behaviours), 
psychopathology, cognitive control, and behavioural control (Rogers, 1984).  As with any 
psychological assessment, the clinician must take everything into consideration, from the 
R-CRAS scores to the physical presentation of the defendant, before making a final 
decision on criminal responsibility (Pozzulo et al., 2015). 
In cases where a NCRMD defence is successful, different options are considered 
in regard to the treatment of the defendant.  The option that the court deems most 
appropriate is based on the defendant’s current mental state and an evaluation of the level 
of threat he or she presents to the public (Pozzulo et al., 2015).  The defendant may be 
granted an absolute discharge, meaning he or she is released without restrictions 
(Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c.46, s.672.54).  This occurs in cases where the criminal 
behaviour is reasonably determined to be an isolated incident resulting from a severe 
episode of the mental illness and should not happen again as long as the individual 
receives the proper treatment (Crocker, Nicholls, Charette, & Seto, 2014; Pozzulo et al., 
2015).  Alternatively, the defendant could be granted a conditional discharge, where he or 
she is released from custody but must meet certain conditions and is monitored to ensure 
these conditions are upheld (Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c.46, s.672.54).  The 
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restrictions put into place during a conditional discharge may include such things as not 
possessing firearms or not possessing any drug or pharmaceutical that was not 
specifically prescribed to the defendant (Crocker et al., 2014; Pozzulo et al., 2015).  
Finally, in cases where discharging the defendant is not deemed appropriate, the 
defendant may be admitted to a psychiatric facility (Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c.46, 
s.672.54).  This final disposition typically occurs when the defendant is still considered to 
be a risk to him or herself, or to others, as a result of severe, ongoing symptoms of the 
mental illness (Crocker et al., 2014). 
Until recently, the chosen disposition was required to be the “least onerous and 
least restrictive” for the defendant (Crocker et al., 2014, p. 579).  This meant that if there 
was evidence from an expert to suggest that the defendant was more likely than not to 
reoffend or to be a danger to the self or others, the court was obligated to grant the 
individual an absolute discharge (Crocker et al., 2014).  It was only if there was an 
indication of the defendant’s prospective threat that the court could hand down the 
disposition of either a conditional discharge or institutionalization (Crocker et al., 2014).  
However, Bill C-14 (previously called Bill C-54) was introduced in 2013 and has since 
been enacted (Bill C-14, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the National Defence 
Act [Bill C-14], 2014).  This Bill removed the “least onerous and least restrictive” 
requirement when deciding on the appropriate disposition, created a separate category of 
mentally ill offenders who are considered “high risk,” and added new procedures that 
require victims and/or victims’ families to be notified when defendants are discharged 
(Bill C-14, 2014). 
Except in the case of an absolute discharge, review boards regularly assess the 
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condition of the defendant to determine if a change in disposition is necessary or if any 
other further action is appropriate (Pozzulo et al., 2015).  In Canada, these boards consist 
of a minimum of five individuals who are appointed provincially by the lieutenant 
governor of each province (Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c.46, s.672.38).  One member 
must be a registered psychiatrist and a second member must have training and experience 
in the field of mental health (Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c.46, s.672.39).  The 
chairperson of the board must be a judge, a retired judge, or somebody who is qualified to 
be a judge (Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c.46, s.672.4).  They are required to meet at 
least once per year to review each case of NCRMD (Pozzulo et al., 2015). 
In terms of a mentally ill offender’s disposition, the review board takes into 
consideration several factors.  First, public safety is an important concern for review 
boards (Pozzulo et al., 2015).  They have to ensure that they are not allowing an offender 
to reenter the general public if there is a significant risk of reoffending.  Closely related to 
this consideration is the mental state of the defendant (Pozzulo et al., 2015).  If the 
defendant is experiencing clear psychotic symptoms, then proper treatment must be 
provided immediately.  Alternatively, if the defendant is deeply affected by the 
realization of what he or she did, there may be a risk to the self, which must be addressed.  
The main goal of the system is to rehabilitate mentally ill offenders and ensure they 
receive the proper treatment, therefore decreasing the likelihood that these individuals 
will go on to commit further offences and increasing public safety (Pozzulo et al., 2015).  
 An important development for the treatment of mentally ill offenders has been 
the emergence of mental health courts.  The main goal of these courts is to divert 
mentally ill offenders into the mental health system and out of the prison system (Hiday, 
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Wales, & Ray, 2013; Pozzulo et al., 2015).  Mental health courts attempt to rehabilitate 
offenders instead of punishing them, and they also place a lot of emphasis on proper 
assessment and treatment (Hiday et al., 2013; Pozzulo et al., 2015).  These courts also do 
their best to ensure that mentally ill offenders experience a smooth integration back into 
society (Hiday et al., 2013; Pozzulo et al., 2015).  Some individuals do not need much 
guidance after they are released, as they have homes and strong support systems.  Others 
need much more guidance.  Depending on the specific person in question, mental health 
courts may provide clothing, find somewhere for the individual to stay, and/or put into 
place an extensive treatment plan that may or may not include providing consistent 
outpatient care (Hiday et al., 2013; Pozzulo et al., 2015).  In order for the courts to be 
able to provide these services, they commonly team up with a variety of community 
organizations, and the rehabilitation of mentally ill offenders is often seen as a 
community effort (Hiday et al., 2013; Pozzulo et al., 2015).  Additionally, studies show 
that offenders with mental illnesses fare better if they stay within the mental health care 
system than if they are subjected to the criminal justice system (Dirks-Linhorst & 
Linhorst, 2012; Hiday et al., 2013; Lim & Day, 2014; McNiel & Binder, 2007). 
Knowledge and attitudes.  Though it is important to possess a basic 
understanding of the current laws and policies concerning mentally ill offenders in order 
to fully comprehend the present research, it is also important to address public knowledge 
and attitudes on the topic.  There have been very few studies looking at public attitudes 
and beliefs toward the NCRMD defence in Canada.  That being said, the insanity defence 
in locations outside of Canada, namely the United States, has received much more 
research.  There seems to be some widespread, yet inaccurate, beliefs toward the insanity 
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defence.  For example, some literature shows that many Americans believe that the 
insanity defence is overused and that too many people get away with their crimes because 
they inappropriately, yet successfully, plead not guilty by reason of insanity (Schlumper, 
2011).  This belief could likely be due to inaccurate portrayals of the insanity plea in the 
media.  In practice, the defence is used quite sparingly (Schlumper, 2011).  Although it is 
not necessarily uncommon for somebody to attempt the defence, only a small percentage 
of these defences actually make it to trial (Schlumper, 2011).  Further, the safeguards and 
procedures put into place to assess an individual’s criminal responsibility have been 
demonstrated to be very effective and it is a rare occurrence that somebody is 
inaccurately deemed not guilty by reason of insanity (Schlumper, 2011).  Another 
common belief is that once a person is acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity, they are 
simply set free (Schlumper, 2011).  In one study, three out of every four participants 
believed that once there is a verdict of insanity, the defendant is unconditionally released 
without any further consultation from mental health professionals (Schlumper, 2011).  
This finding suggests that many individuals have inaccurate information about the 
different possible dispositions in these cases, believing every person deemed not 
criminally responsible is automatically granted an absolute discharge or is not held 
accountable within the forensic mental health system. 
 Research specifically looking at overall attitudes toward the insanity defence 
exists, but little research has been completed recently.  Findings from several decades ago 
suggested that the general attitude toward the insanity defence in the United States was 
negative at the time (Hans, 1986).  Furthermore, there was little to no relationship 
between attitudes toward the defence and basic demographic variables, such as age or sex 
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(Hans, 1986).  Although these are important findings, it must be kept in mind that the 
attitudes today may be very different than the attitudes from over thirty years ago.  Also, 
it cannot be forgotten that the study in question focused on the insanity defence outside of 
Canada.  That being said, results from a recent study in Canada suggest that the overall 
attitude toward the NCRMD defence may actually be slightly positive (Power, 2015). 
Psychopathy 
Moving away from the general topic of mentally ill offenders in Canada, a subset 
of the population crucial to the present research will now be discussed - psychopaths. 
Conceptualization.  Though psychopathy is a term that has emerged relatively 
recently, it is believed that aspects of what we would now consider psychopathy have 
been referenced since biblical times (Rotenberg & Diamond, 1971).  In the early 1800s, 
Pinel used the term manie sans délire to refer to a condition believed to consist of the 
presence of mania without delusional thinking, or more broadly, psychological 
disturbance without disordered thoughts (Horley, 2014).  Some consider the appearance 
of Pinel’s construct to mark the onset of the development of today’s conceptualizations of 
psychopathy (Horley, 2014).  Following Pinel, several individuals, including Pritchard, 
Lombroso, and Kraepelin, began to discuss features included in, or relevant to, the 
modern view of the psychopath (Moreira, Almeida, Pinto, & Fávero, 2014).  However, it 
was arguably the influence of Hervey Cleckley in the 1900s that led to a major increase 
in the curiosity toward, and current understanding of, psychopathy. 
Cleckley relied on several case studies to describe what he considered the 
psychopathic personality.  Initially, his case studies exclusively described men, but he 
later included women in his work.  Cleckley originally identified 21 basic characteristics 
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of psychopathy (Cleckley, 1941).  After several revisions to the number and content of 
these characteristics, 16 were ultimately selected (Cleckley, 1976).  These characteristics, 
collectively referred to as his clinical profile, are: 1) superficial charm and good 
intelligence, 2) absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking, 3) absence of 
nervousness or psychoneurotic manifestations, 4) unreliability, 5) untruthfulness and 
insincerity, 6) lack of remorse or shame, 7) inadequately motivated antisocial behavior, 
8) poor judgment and failure to learn by experience, 9) pathologic egocentricity and 
incapacity for love, 10) general poverty in major affective reactions, 11) specific loss of 
insight, 12) unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations, 13) fantastic and 
uninviting behavior with drink and sometimes without, 14) suicide threats rarely carried 
out, 15) sex life impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated, and 16) failure to follow any 
life plan (Cleckley, 1976).  Cleckley’s profile of psychopathic individuals has been 
extremely influential in the development of today’s conceptualizations of psychopathy. 
Robert Hare is a prominent psychopathy researcher, considered by many to be 
one of the most significant psychopathy experts currently in the field.  Often citing 
Cleckley’s work as inspiration for his own (Hare & Neumann, 2008), Hare has developed 
perhaps the best known and most widely used conceptualization of psychopathy today.  
According to Hare’s model, psychopathy is made up of two factors: Factor 1 
(Interpersonal/Affective) includes traits such as manipulativeness and callousness; Factor 
2 (Lifestyle/Antisocial) includes traits such as impulsiveness and criminal versatility 
(Hare, 2003).  Since the emergence of Hare’s conceptualization of psychopathy, research 
pertaining to these individuals has increased dramatically. 
Criminal responsibility.  As previously mentioned, the presence of psychopathy 
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is not typically seen as an acceptable reason for removing an individual’s criminal 
responsibility (Morse, 2008).  In fact, psychopathy is typically considered a risk factor for 
dangerousness and recidivism and therefore psychopaths often receive more severe 
sentences than nonpsychopaths for similar crimes (Morse, 2008).  While it is certainly 
possible for a psychopath to receive an additional diagnosis of a separate mental illness 
that could qualify him or her for the NCRMD defence, some researchers (e.g., Freedman 
& Verdun-Jones, 2010) are now arguing that the presence of psychopathy alone may in 
fact be solid grounds for the consideration of deeming a defendant not criminally 
responsible for his or her illegal actions.  It should be noted that because the term mental 
disorder is defined so broadly within the law, as discussed above, it is not impossible for 
judges to decide that psychopathy is a mental disorder in certain contexts.  In actuality, 
“psychopathic personality” has been considered a disease of the mind in the past (R. v. 
Rabey, 1977).  However, due to the fact that psychopathy is often seen as an aggravating 
factor for sentencing, it is not overly likely for a judge to currently consider the condition 
a mental disorder.  That being said, it is not out of the realm of possibility that judges 
may begin to regard psychopathy as a mental disorder more often if some researchers 
continue to present arguments for removing a psychopath’s criminal responsibility. 
One major argument for deeming psychopaths not criminally responsible is the 
idea that they are not moral agents.  This argument posits that psychopaths are not part of 
the moral community, as they cannot comprehend the difference between acts that are 
morally right and morally wrong (Blair, 1995; 1997; Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith, 1995).  
They are able to understand rules and conventions, and what is considered legally wrong, 
but it may be the case that there is some deficit that leads to the inability to internalize 
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moral norms during crucial developmental stages (Fine & Kennett, 2004).  However, 
recent research has suggested that this lack of moral understanding in psychopaths may 
not actually be the case.  For example, Aharoni, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Kiehl (2014) 
found no relationship between psychopathy and performance on the Moral-Conventional 
Transgressions Task.  This task requires participants to differentiate between acts that are 
considered morally wrong (e.g., physically harming someone) and acts considered wrong 
simply by conventional standards (e.g., breaking a school rule such as talking in class).  
Aharoni et al.’s (2014) finding suggests that perhaps psychopaths do understand the 
difference between moral rights and wrongs, but simply choose not to pay attention to 
moral standards. 
Results from a separate study found that psychopathic inmates judged the 
permissibility of acts described in moral scenarios in the same manner as both 
nonpsychopathic inmates and healthy controls (Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010).  These 
findings held true for personal scenarios (i.e., requiring physical contact) and impersonal 
scenarios (i.e., not requiring physical contact), though personal acts were seen as less 
moral overall.  There were also no group differences in ratings for whether or not the 
moral acts were self-serving or other-serving, though self-serving acts were seen as less 
moral across all groups.  These findings suggest that there may not actually be 
differences in moral judgments between psychopaths and nonpsychopaths, and this may 
be true across multiple types of situations.  That being said, the idea that psychopaths are 
not moral agents is a recurrent argument some researchers (e.g., Blair, 1995; 1997; Blair 
et al., 1995) provide for potentially deeming psychopaths not criminally responsible. 
A second argument for deeming psychopaths not criminally responsible stems 
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from recent advances in neurobiological research.  This argument is based on the fact that 
several neurobiological abnormalities have been found in psychopathic individuals 
compared to nonpsychopathic individuals.  For example, the amygdala and orbitofrontal 
cortex have both been associated with fear processing and empathy, and psychopathic 
individuals tend to experience measurable dysfunction in these areas (Freedman & 
Verdun-Jones, 2010).  Both fear processing and empathy have been theorized to play a 
role in moral socialization.  As a result, perhaps the abnormal activity occurring in the 
amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex at least partially explains a psychopath’s lack of 
concern about living up to moral standards.  Further, abnormal levels of 
neurotransmitters, specifically serotonin and dopamine, have been associated with certain 
behavioural problems commonly seen in psychopathic individuals (Freedman & Verdun-
Jones, 2010).  Research suggests that psychopaths may chronically experience abnormal 
levels of both of these neurotransmitters.  Therefore, it may be possible that psychopaths 
engage in the harmful behaviours they do as a result of these abnormal neurotransmitter 
levels.  Whatever the case, some researchers (e.g., Freedman & Verdun-Jones, 2010) who 
argue that psychopaths should not necessarily be regarded as criminally responsible for 
their actions frequently discuss advances in neurobiological research to support their 
position. 
Attitude Strength and Susceptibility to Change 
 To sufficiently appreciate the present research, it is important to not only 
understand the history and current treatment of mentally ill offenders and the construct of 
psychopathy, but also to have a fundamental understanding of attitude strength and 
change.  According to the Causal Attitude Network (CAN) model, attitudes can be 
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conceived as networks of interacting feelings, beliefs, and behaviours, collectively 
referred to as evaluative reactions (Dalege et al., 2016).  Attitudes can be changed 
through a variety of processes.  In the case of this study, however, the most relevant 
process is through the presentation of persuasive arguments. 
Strong attitudes are characteristically stable and resistant to change (Bassili, 2008; 
Dalege et al., 2016).  Although there are several characteristics associated with attitude 
strength (Bassili, 2008), a suitable indicator of attitude strength for this study is 
extremeness (i.e., how near or far attitudes fall from the midpoint of a scale in self-report 
measures).  Hence, people who indicate their attitudes as closer to the ends (extremes) of 
a given scale should, in theory, be more resistant to changes in these attitudes than people 
who indicate their attitudes as closer to the midpoint of the scale.  Correspondingly, the 
closer to neutral any given attitude is, the easier it should be to change through the 
presentation of arguments (Bassili, 2008).  Knowledge about the attitudinal object has 
been associated with the strength of the attitude as well, in the sense that knowledge 
intensifies the effect of attitude strength on susceptibility to change (Dalege et al., 2016).  
Put another way, strong attitudes combined with high levels of knowledge about the 
target object results in attitudes that are even more stable and resistant.  It has also been 
suggested that experts are more likely to change people’s attitudes through persuasive 
arguments than nonexperts, likely because people tend to believe that the opinion of an 
expert in a given field is relatively valid and has a reputable basis (Bohner, Ruder, & Erb, 
2002). 
The Present Study 
In light of the current debate within the field of forensic psychology concerning 
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whether or not psychopaths should be held criminally responsible for their illegal actions, 
the purpose of the present study is to explore public perceptions on the topic.  
Determining how the general population feels about psychopathy and criminal 
responsibility is very important, especially because laws and policies are often created 
and modified to reflect popular opinion. That said, popular opinion is not always 
supported by scientific knowledge.  For instance, it has been argued that Bill C-14 was 
heavily influenced by a wave of highly publicized instances of violent crimes committed 
by individuals with mental illnesses in the recent past, including the widely known case 
of Vince Li in 2008 (e.g., Lacroix, O’Shaughnessy, McNiel, & Binder, 2017).  It seems 
that these exceptional cases led to a generally negative public opinion toward the system 
that was in place at the time.  There were multiple aspects of the Bill that several 
professionals argued would be detrimental to the treatment of mentally ill offenders (e.g., 
Canadian Bar Association, 2013; Lacroix et al., 2017).  However, the Bill was still passed 
and enacted.  Consequently, many believe that Bill C-14 was the result of attempting to 
please the uneducated public and not the result of systematic research (e.g., Lacroix et al., 
2017).  Hence, one would not be misguided to anticipate the emergence of bills that 
propose changes to the laws concerning a psychopath’s criminal responsibility based on, 
or at least heavily influenced by, public opinion. 
While it is true that laws are often influenced by public opinion, it is also the case 
that the opposite can apply.  That is, the laws and policies of the time can also influence 
public opinion.  For example, Pacheco (2013) found that members of the American 
public viewed cigarette smokers in a more negative light and considered exposure to 
secondhand smoke more dangerous after the enactment of smoking bans in restaurants in 
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the participants’ respective states.  Thus, not only could public attitudes and beliefs about 
psychopathy and criminal responsibility have a meaningful impact on the types of bills 
that emerge concerning the issue, but the passage of bills that may not have been heavily 
influenced by public opinion could actually affect how the public views psychopathy as 
well.  For example, if a bill were to be proposed that aimed to treat psychopathic 
offenders as mentally ill offenders, qualifying psychopaths for the NCRMD defence, it is 
certainly possible that the public would follow suit and become more likely to consider 
psychopathy a mental illness and believe that psychopaths should be deemed not 
criminally responsible for their actions.  Alternatively, if a bill emerged that aimed to 
create harsher punishments for psychopathic offenders, the public could potentially be 
less likely to view psychopathy as a mental illness and, correspondingly, be less likely to 
view psychopaths as eligible for the defence.  Due to the reciprocal relationship between 
public opinion and law, it would be wise to determine how exactly members of the public 
view psychopathy in relation to criminal responsibility sooner rather than later. 
An online survey was developed for the purpose of the present study to assess 
knowledge and attitudes toward psychopathy and criminal responsibility.  By modifying 
selected questions from the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Fourth Edition (SRP IV; 
Paulhus, Hemphill, & Hare, 2016), a measure of psychopathy knowledge was created.  
The Insanity Defense Attitude Scale-Revised (IDA-R; Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 2004) 
was included, with slight revisions to reflect Canadian terminology, to measure general 
attitudes toward the NCRMD defence.  Questions were also added to assess perceptions 
of psychopathy in relation to criminal responsibility (i.e., whether psychopathy was 
believed to be a mental illness, whether psychopaths were believed to be eligible for the 
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NCRMD defence, and whether psychopaths were seen as responsible for their negative 
actions).  These questions were asked both before and after the presentation of one of 
four randomly assigned news articles, each depicting a homicide at the hands of a 
diagnosed psychopath, to determine participants’ initial attitudes and to examine whether 
the information provided in the articles influenced these attitudes.  The news article 
format was used in the present study to increase ecological validity, as the public tends to 
receive most of their information regarding crime and sentencing from news media 
(Roberts & Doob, 1990).  Questions specifically based on the case described in the news 
article were also included to assess various aspects of how the event was perceived.  
These questions measured opinions of perpetrator responsibility, the extent of perpetrator 
mental illness, the necessity of criminal punishment, the perpetrator’s NCRMD 
eligibility, NCRMD likelihood, and potential NCRMD success, the responsibility of the 
victim, as well as possible consequence suggestions.  They were asked both directly after 
the news article was displayed as well as after the presentation of a brief paragraph about 
psychopathy to determine participants’ initial perceptions and to examine whether 
acquiring more knowledge about the construct of psychopathy would affect how the 
event was perceived.  A number of hypotheses and additional research questions were 
developed: 
Hypothesis 1.  A recent study suggested that the general attitude toward the 
NCRMD defence in Canada was slightly positive (Power, 2015).  Hence, I hypothesized 
that this finding would be replicated in the present study (i.e., the overall attitude toward 
the NCRMD defence would be positive), as indicated by a score significantly lower than 
76.00 (i.e., the midpoint) on the IDA-R. 
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Hypothesis 2.  Strong attitudes are resistant to change, and extremeness (i.e., 
where ratings fall relative to the ends of a scale in self-report measures) is one indicator 
of attitude strength (Bassili, 2008).  Thus, in terms of participants’ attitudes toward 
psychopathy being a mental illness, psychopaths’ eligibility for the NCRMD defence, 
and psychopaths’ responsibility for their negative actions, I hypothesized that 
participants’ initial attitude strength, as indicated by absolute extremeness (i.e., the 
absolute value when the midpoint of the scale is subtracted from participants’ ratings), 
would be related to the effectiveness of the expert’s argument in the assigned news 
article.  More specifically, I hypothesized that participants with weaker initial attitudes 
would alter their attitudes in accordance with the argument provided by the expert in the 
assigned article to a greater extent than participants with stronger initial attitudes.  
Relatedly, I also hypothesized that initial attitude extremeness would affect attitude 
change differently across the four conditions, though exactly where these differences 
would occur was not hypothesized a priori as this idea was more exploratory in nature. 
Additional research questions.  The extent to which participants initially a) 
consider psychopathy a mental illness, b) believe psychopaths should be eligible for the 
NCRMD defence, and c) believe psychopaths are responsible for their negative actions 
are three very important research questions that the present study will address.  It is also 
of interest whether these initial ratings will be related to participants’ overall attitudes 
toward the NCRMD defence (i.e., IDA-R scores) and whether there will be any changes 
in these ratings after reading the news article, more specifically the expert quote.  
However, due to a lack of previous research on public perceptions toward psychopathy in 
relation to mental illness or criminal responsibility, no specific hypotheses were made 
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regarding these questions. 
Determining whether there will be differences across the four variations of the 
news article in terms of ratings of perpetrator responsibility, the extent of perpetrator 
mental illness, the necessity of criminal punishment, the perpetrator’s NCRMD 
eligibility, NCRMD likelihood, and potential NCRMD success, the responsibility of the 
victim, as well as open-ended consequence suggestions are all crucial components of the 
present research.  Further, determining whether or not being presented with a short 
description of psychopathy will alter any of the ratings or consequence suggestions is of 
interest as well.  Again, as there is a lack of previous research assessing perceptions of 
psychopaths and criminal responsibility, specific hypotheses were not developed. 
  
	 22 
	
Method 
Participants 
 A sample of 296 participants (224 women, 72 men) was recruited from the 
Canadian general population using three online platforms: Kijiji, Facebook, and Reddit.  
The participants ranged from 18-80 years of age (M = 28.41, SD = 10.87).  These 
participants agreed to voluntarily complete an online survey assessing knowledge of, and 
attitudes toward, psychopathy and criminal responsibility. 
Scales 
 Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Fourth Edition.  The Self-Report Psychopathy 
Scale-Fourth Edition (SRP IV; Paulhus et al., 2016) consists of a series of statements 
about the self to which individuals rate their agreement on a Likert scale from 1 (disagree 
strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).  The scale measures the following four facets of 
psychopathy: interpersonal manipulation (e.g., “I purposely flatter people to get them on 
my side,” α = .82), callous affect (e.g., “I’m more tough-minded than other people,” α = 
.75), erratic lifestyle (e.g., “I’m a rebellious person,” α = .78), and antisocial behaviour 
(e.g., “I was convicted of a serious crime,” α = .69).  Of note, the reliability coefficients 
provided are as reported by Gordts, Uzieblo, Neumann, Van den Bussche, and Rossi 
(2017).  Through borrowing traits and behaviours from each of the four subscales of the 
SRP IV, a measure was created to assess participants’ knowledge of psychopathy by 
indicating whether they believed the traits or behaviours described were indicative of 
psychopathy.  For example, participants read the statement, “Psychopaths purposely 
flatter people to get them on their side” and then indicated whether they believed this 
statement was true or false.   
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Insanity Defense Attitude Scale-Revised.  The Insanity Defense Attitude Scale-
Revised (IDA-R; Skeem et al., 2004) consists of a series of statements about the 
American insanity defence to which individuals indicate the extent to which they agree or 
disagree using a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (e.g., “I 
believe that people should be held responsible for their actions no matter what their 
mental condition”).  The scale provides a total score (ranging from 19.00 to 133.00) for 
overall attitude toward the defence.  Lower scores indicate more positive views of the 
defence while higher scores indicate more negative views.  Hence, a score of 76.00 (the 
midpoint of the scale) would indicate a neutral attitude toward the defence.  It should be 
noted that the language of the scale was modified for the present study to reflect the 
Canadian terminology of NCRMD (permission to do so was granted by the scale 
authors).  No other modifications were made to the scale.  However, as the language was 
altered, a reliability coefficient was calculated using the present data.  It was determined 
that this version of the IDA-R had excellent internal consistency when used with the 
present Canadian sample (α = .94). 
Perceptions of psychopathy.  Questions were included in the survey to assess 
whether participants believed psychopathy is a mental illness, whether psychopaths 
should qualify for the NCRMD defence, and whether psychopaths are responsible for 
their negative actions.  Participants indicated how much they agreed or disagreed with 
each statement using a Likert scale.  For example, participants read the statement, 
“Psychopathy is a mental illness” and indicated their level of agreement from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).   
 News article.  Participants were presented with a news article depicting a 
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homicide and were asked a series of questions based on the article.  These questions 
examined participants’ opinions on perpetrator responsibility, the extent of perpetrator 
mental illness, the necessity of criminal punishment, the perpetrator’s NCRMD 
eligibility, NCRMD likelihood, and potential NCRMD success, the responsibility of the 
victim, as well as appropriate consequences.  The format of each of these questions was 
either a Likert scale or open-ended.  For example, participants were asked, “How 
responsible is the perpetrator for what he did?” with possible answers ranging from 1 (not 
at all responsible) to 7 (completely responsible), and “What would a suitable 
consequence be?” in an open-ended format. 
Procedure 
Participants read an advertisement (see Appendix A) for an online survey on 
Kijiji, Facebook, or Reddit that included a link to an informed consent page (see 
Appendix B).  Upon providing consent, participants began the survey (see Appendix C).  
First, participants recorded their email address to enable them to be entered into a draw 
for a $100 Tim Horton’s gift card.  Next, they provided their age, sex, and the highest 
level of education they had received.  Participants then completed the HEXACO-60 
(Ashton & Lee, 2009), the results of which are beyond the scope of this project.  
Participants were then assessed on their knowledge of psychopathy by indicating whether 
they believed certain traits or behaviours, derived from the Self-Report Psychopathy 
Scale-Fourth Edition (SRP IV; Paulhus et al., 2016), were indicative of psychopathy.  
Participants then completed a slightly revised version of the Insanity Defense Attitude 
Scale-Revised (IDA-R; Skeem et al., 2004), which reflected the Canadian terminology of 
not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder rather than the American 
	 25 
	
terminology of not guilty by reason of insanity.  Next, participants indicated whether or 
not they believed psychopathy is a mental illness, whether or not psychopaths should be 
eligible for the NCRMD defence, and whether or not psychopaths are responsible for 
their negative actions. 
Participants then read one of four short news articles (see Appendix D) depicting 
a homicide.  The articles stated that the man who committed the homicide completed a 
full psychological assessment and had been classified as a psychopath.  All four articles 
were identical with the exception of a quote provided by an expert in the area of 
psychopathy.  The expert in the mental illness condition (Condition A) argued that 
psychopathy is a mental illness and engaging in violent behaviours is not a psychopath’s 
fault.  This quote was largely based on the aforementioned neurobiological arguments for 
deeming psychopaths not criminally responsible (e.g., Freedman & Verdun-Jones, 2010).  
The expert in the not mental illness condition (Condition B) argued that psychopathy is 
not a mental illness and engaging in violent behaviours is not predetermined or out of a 
psychopath’s control.  This quote was created to reflect the longstanding idea that 
psychopathy is not a mental illness and that psychopaths should be held criminally 
responsible for their actions (Morse, 2008).  The expert in the emotional deficit condition 
(Condition C) argued that psychopaths may lack the emotional capacity to feel bad for 
their actions, but they do not lack the cognitive ability to understand the difference 
between what is right and what is wrong.  This quote was based on findings that suggest 
psychopaths understand moral rights and wrongs, but perhaps just do not care to pay 
attention to the distinction (e.g., Aharoni et al., 2014; Cima et al., 2010).  There was no 
expert quote in Condition D.  Participants’ opinions on perpetrator responsibility, the 
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extent of perpetrator mental illness, the necessity of criminal punishment, the 
perpetrator’s NCRMD eligibility, NCRMD likelihood, and potential NCRMD success, 
the responsibility of the victim, as well as appropriate consequences were then assessed. 
Participants then answered the questions assessing whether or not they believed 
psychopathy is a mental illness, whether or not psychopaths should be eligible for the 
NCRMD defence, and whether or not psychopaths are responsible for their negative 
actions for a second time to determine whether the information provided in the news 
article, specifically the expert quote, would have an effect on these beliefs.  Finally, 
participants read a short paragraph (see Appendix E) providing some background 
information on psychopathy and once again answered the questions specifically based on 
the news article they had previously read in order to determine whether acquiring 
information about the construct of psychopathy would have an effect on participants’ 
perceptions of the case.  All participants were shown a debriefing page (see Appendix F) 
and thanked for their participation upon completion of the survey. 
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Results 
 Results are organized to first address general attitudes toward the NCRMD 
defence (i.e., IDA-R scores).  Ratings of whether psychopathy was seen as a mental 
illness, whether psychopaths should be eligible for the NCRMD defence, and whether 
psychopaths should be held responsible for their negative actions are then examined by 
relating these scores to the IDA-R, as well as analyzing the initial scores, the change in 
scores after reading the assigned news article, and the effect of initial attitude 
extremeness on attitude change.  Answers to the questions specifically pertaining to the 
information provided in the news article are then analyzed, including both the initial 
scores and the change in scores after participants were presented with a brief paragraph 
that provided information about the construct of psychopathy.  Of note, statistical 
assumptions were tested prior to commencing data analysis and no issues were found.  
For means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations of the main study variables, see 
Table 1. 
Attitudes Toward the NCRMD Defence 
A neutral score on the IDA-R is 76.00.  Scores lower than 76.00 indicate a 
positive attitude toward the NCRMD defence and scores higher than 76.00 indicate a 
negative attitude toward the defence.  In the present study, the mean overall score on the 
IDA-R was 62.06 (SE = 1.37).  Consistent with Hypothesis 1, a one-sample t-test 
determined that the mean overall score on the IDA-R was significantly lower than 76.00, 
t(266) = -10.18, p < .001, d = -0.62, indicating a somewhat positive attitude toward the 
NCRMD defence among the current sample. 
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Table 1. Overall means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations of main study variables (1 of 3). 
 1 2 3 4 
 a b a b a b a b 
Psychopathy         
     1. Mental illness         
          a. Time 1 -        
          b. Time 2 .80*** -       
     2. NCRMD eligibility         
          a. Time 1 .49*** .42*** -      
          b. Time 2 .44*** .46*** .82*** -     
     3. Responsibility         
          a. Time 1 -.19*** -.22*** -.44*** -.45*** -    
          b. Time 2 -.16*** -.22*** -.46*** -.50*** .77*** -   
News article         
     4. Responsibility         
          a. Time 1 -.21*** -.25*** -.42*** -.53*** .53*** .57*** -  
          b. Time 2 -.11*** -.19*** -.33*** -.41*** .50*** .55*** .71*** - 
     5. Mental illness         
          a. Time 1 .48*** .64*** .40*** .44*** -.30*** -.27*** -.25*** -.16*** 
          b. Time 2 .55*** .72*** .40*** .45*** -.29*** -.26*** -.29*** -.18*** 
     6. Necessity of punishment         
          a. Time 1 -.24*** -.29*** -.47*** -.55*** .62*** .65*** .66*** .61*** 
          b. Time 2 -.21*** -.24*** -.38*** -.48*** .58*** .54*** .58*** .62*** 
     7.  NCRMD eligibility         
          a. Time 1 .36*** .44*** .65*** .80*** -.46*** -.50*** -.52*** -.40*** 
          b. Time 2 .34*** .43*** .61*** .76*** -.40*** -.43*** -.48*** -.44*** 
     8.  NCRMD likelihood         
          a. Time 1 .15*** .16*** .16*** .20*** -.09*** -.04*** -.01*** .02*** 
          b. Time 2 .11*** .11*** .20*** .24*** -.12*** -.06*** -.12*** -.03*** 
     9.  NCRMD success         
          a. Time 1 .22*** .22*** .32*** .43*** -.20*** -.19*** -.24*** -.10*** 
          b. Time 2 .19*** .19*** .22*** .35*** -.16*** -.16*** -.21*** -.12*** 
     10. Victim blame         
          a. Time 1 .12*** .17*** .03*** .06*** .07*** .10*** .08*** .15*** 
          b. Time 2 .14*** .20*** .10*** .16*** -.02*** .01*** -.03*** .07*** 
Other         
     11. IDA-R total score -.06*** -.09*** -.19*** -.16*** .31*** .32*** .30*** .30*** 
     12. Psychopathy knowledge -.02*** -.03*** -.17*** -.21*** .16*** .22*** .16*** .15*** 
     13. Age -.03*** -.08*** -.07*** -.06*** -.06*** -.01*** .00*** .03*** 
     14. Sex .02*** .01*** .04*** .04*** -.04*** -.03*** -.08*** .05*** 
         
M 5.28 5.03 3.52 3.61 5.18 5.33 5.57 5.86 
SD 1.69 1.81 1.86 1.93 1.57 1.53 1.50 1.18 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Perceptions of Psychopathy 
Relation to IDA-R.  To assess the relationship between general attitudes toward 
the NCRMD defence and perceptions of psychopathy in regard to criminal responsibility, 
responses to the items assessing perceptions of psychopathy were correlated with IDA-R  
	 29 
	
Table 1. Overall means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations of main study variables (2 of 3). 
 5 6 7 8 
 a b a b a b a b 
     5. Mental illness         
          a. Time 1 -        
          b. Time 2 .78*** -       
     6. Necessity of punishment         
          a. Time 1 -.35*** -.33*** -      
          b. Time 2 -.25*** -.27*** .81*** -     
     7.  NCRMD eligibility         
          a. Time 1 .50*** .47*** -.61*** -.50*** -    
          b. Time 2 .43*** .47*** -.59*** -.52*** .84*** -   
     8.  NCRMD likelihood         
          a. Time 1 .15*** .10*** -.05*** -.03*** .23*** .22*** -  
          b. Time 2 .13*** .12*** -.12*** -.05*** .28*** .26*** .81*** - 
     9.  NCRMD success         
          a. Time 1 .30*** .24*** -.27*** -.22*** .46*** .41*** .56*** .55*** 
          b. Time 2 .22*** .21*** -.23*** -.24*** .38*** .45*** .51*** .49*** 
     10. Victim blame         
          a. Time 1 .02*** .10*** .05*** .04*** .04*** .10*** .02*** -.06*** 
          b. Time 2 .02*** .12*** -.01*** .00*** .07*** .15*** .03*** -.02*** 
Other         
     11. IDA-R total score -.11*** -.13*** .38*** .32*** -.20*** -.13*** .31*** .31*** 
     12. Psychopathy knowledge -.05*** -.05*** .21*** .22*** -.19*** -.19*** .02*** -.01*** 
     13. Age -.05*** -.05*** -.10*** -.05*** .02*** -.06*** .03*** .01*** 
     14. Sex .04*** .03*** -.12*** -.12*** .03*** -.03*** -.01*** .01*** 
         
M 4.90 4.80 5.66 5.70 3.46 3.53 5.20 5.07 
SD 1.70 1.73 1.33 1.31 1.79 1.78 1.66 1.70 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
scores.  IDA-R scores were negatively correlated with participants’ opinions that 
psychopaths should be eligible for the NCRMD defence, r = -.19, n = 267, p = .002, and 
positively correlated with participants’ opinions that psychopaths are responsible for their 
negative actions, r = .31, n = 267, p < .001.  Thus, the more negative people’s attitudes 
were toward the NCRMD defence, the less likely they were to believe that psychopaths 
should be eligible for the defence and the more likely they were to believe that 
psychopaths are responsible for their negative actions.  IDA-R scores were not related to 
participants’ opinions that psychopathy is a mental illness. 
Initial scores.  One-sample t-tests were conducted to determine whether initial 
answers to the three questions assessing attitudes toward psychopathy in regard to  
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Table 1. Overall means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations of main study variables (3 of 3). 
 9 10     
 a b a b 11 12 13 14 
     9.  NCRMD success         
          a. Time 1 -        
          b. Time 2 .82*** -       
     10. Victim blame         
          a. Time 1 -.02*** .03*** -      
          b. Time 2 .02*** .09*** .82*** -     
Other         
     11. IDA-R total score .34*** .38*** .09*** .12*** -    
     12. Psychopathy knowledge -.13*** -.14*** -.06*** -.13*** .10*** -   
     13. Age .04*** .04*** .08*** .10*** -.04*** -.07*** -  
     14. Sex -.04*** -.01*** -.05*** -.06*** .02*** -.06*** .13*** - 
         
M 3.65 3.57 2.62 2.51 62.06 15.07 28.41 0.24 
SD 1.69 1.68 2.21 2.21 22.38 3.13 10.87 0.43 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
criminal responsibility were significantly different from neutral (i.e., a score of 4.00; see 
Figure 1).  The mean score for whether psychopathy was believed to be a mental illness 
was 5.28 (SE = 0.10), a score significantly higher than 4.00, t(269) = 12.44, p < .001, d = 
0.76.  The mean score for whether psychopaths should be eligible for the NCRMD 
defence was 3.52 (SE = 0.11), a score significantly lower than 4.00, t(270) = -4.21, p < 
.001, d = -0.26.  Lastly, the mean score for whether psychopaths were seen as responsible 
for their negative actions was 5.18 (SE = 0.10), a score significantly higher than 4.00, 
t(270) = 12.39, p < .001, d = 0.76.  On average, participants believed psychopathy is a 
mental illness, psychopaths should not be eligible for the NCRMD defence, and 
psychopaths are responsible for their negative actions. 
Change in scores.  Mixed ANOVAs with time and condition as independent 
variables were conducted to determine whether answers to the three questions assessing 
attitudes toward psychopathy concerning criminal responsibility changed after reading 
the randomly assigned news article (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations).  For 
whether psychopathy was seen as a mental illness, there was a significant time by  
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Figure 1. Initial perceptions of psychopathy. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
condition interaction, F(3, 256) = 13.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .13.  Pairwise comparisons 
determined that participants in the not mental illness condition believed psychopathy was 
a mental illness to a lesser extent after reading the article (M = 4.31, SE = 0.21) than they 
did before (M = 5.24, SE = 0.21), p < .001, d = -0.49.  There was no effect of time for the 
other conditions. 
For whether psychopaths were seen as eligible for the NCRMD defence, there 
was another significant time by condition interaction, F(3, 257) = 7.45, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.08.  Pairwise comparisons determined that participants in the mental illness condition 
believed psychopaths should be eligible for the NCRMD defence to a greater extent after 
reading the article (M = 4.06, SE = 0.24) than they did before (M = 3.56, SE = 0.24), p < 
.001, d = 0.29.  Further, participants in the not mental illness condition believed 
psychopaths should be eligible for the NCRMD defence to a lesser extent after reading  
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations for psychopathy questions by condition. 
 Condition 
 Mental illness Not mental illness Emotional deficit No expert 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1. Mental illness         
     Time 1 5.21 1.61 5.24 1.82 5.38 1.83 5.33 1.55 
     Time 2 5.25 1.55 4.31 1.99 5.29 1.88 5.36 1.57 
2. NCRMD eligibility         
     Time 1 3.56 1.77 3.45 1.97 3.47 2.08 3.75 1.72 
     Time 2 4.06 1.65 3.15 1.92 3.27 2.10 3.97 1.89 
3. Responsibility         
     Time 1 5.21 1.33 5.25 1.60 5.47 1.52 4.76 1.79 
     Time 2 5.03 1.32 5.55 1.52 5.73 1.54 5.00 1.62 
 
the article (M = 3.15, SE = 0.23) than they did before (M = 3.45, SE = 0.23), p = .028, d = 
-0.15.  There was no effect of time for the other conditions. 
Lastly, for whether psychopaths were seen as responsible for their negative 
actions, there was yet another time by condition interaction, F(3, 257) = 2.94, p = .034, 
ηp2 = .03.  Pairwise comparisons determined that participants in the not mental illness 
condition believed psychopaths were responsible for their negative actions to a greater 
extent after reading the article (M = 5.55, SE = 0.18) than they did before (M = 5.25, SE = 
0.19), p = .019, d = 0.19.  Further, participants in the emotional deficit condition also 
believed psychopaths were responsible for their negative actions to a greater extent after 
reading the article (M = 5.73, SE = 0.19) than they did before (M = 5.47, SE = 0.20), p = 
.041, d = 0.17.  There was no effect of time for the other conditions. 
Relation to attitude strength.  To assess the relationship between initial attitude 
strength and attitude change in regard to perceptions of psychopathy, absolute 
extremeness (i.e., the absolute value when the midpoint of the scale is subtracted from 
participants’ ratings) of the answers to the items assessing perceptions of psychopathy 
were correlated with the absolute difference scores of these questions before and after 
reading the article.  Of note, one-tailed analyses were conducted as the direction of the 
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relationship between attitude strength and attitude change was hypothesized a priori.  In 
terms of whether participants believed psychopathy is a mental illness, extremeness was 
negatively correlated with attitude change, r = -.12, n = 260, p = .024.  Further, in terms 
of whether participants believed psychopaths should be eligible for the NCRMD defence, 
extremeness was also negatively correlated with attitude change, r = -.16, n = 261, p = 
.005.  Lastly, in terms of whether participants believed psychopaths are responsible for 
their negative actions, extremeness was once again negatively correlated with attitude 
change, r = -.13, n = 261, p = .019.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2, these findings suggest 
that stronger initial attitudes toward psychopathy in regard to criminal responsibility were 
associated with less change in these attitudes after reading the news article. 
In order to further understand the relationship between attitude strength and 
attitude change for each perception of psychopathy, absolute extremeness was also 
correlated with absolute difference scores separately for each condition (see Table 3).  In 
terms of whether participants in the emotional deficit condition believed psychopathy is a 
mental illness, extremeness was negatively correlated with attitude change, r = -.50, n = 
63, p < .001.  In terms of whether participants in the emotional deficit condition believed 
psychopaths should be eligible for the NCRMD defence, extremeness was also negatively 
correlated with attitude change, r = -.49, n = 64, p < .001.  In terms of whether 
participants in the emotional deficit condition believed psychopaths are responsible for 
their negative actions, extremeness was once again negatively correlated with attitude 
change, r = -.40, n = 64, p = .001.  In terms of whether participants in the no expert 
condition believed psychopaths should be eligible for the NCRMD defence, extremeness 
was also negatively correlated with attitude change, r = -.30, n = 67, p < .006.  Initial  
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          Table 3. Bivariate correlations between absolute attitude extremeness and 
          absolute attitude change by condition. 
 Condition 
 Mental 
illness 
Not mental 
illness 
Emotional 
deficit 
No 
expert 
1. Mental illness -.06*** .01*** -.50*** -.12*** 
2. NCRMD eligibility .09*** .00*** -.49*** -.30*** 
3. Responsibility .12*** -.17*** -.40*** -.13*** 
          **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
attitude extremeness was not related to attitude change for participants in the mental 
illness or not mental illness conditions. 
News Article 
Initial scores.  To determine whether there were differences amongst perceptions 
of the event described in the news article across the four conditions, ANOVAs were 
conducted with condition as the independent variable and the different questions 
pertaining to the article as dependent variables (see Figure 2).  There was a significant 
difference across the four conditions in ratings of perpetrator responsibility, F(3, 253) = 
7.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .08.  A Tukey post hoc test determined that participants in the mental 
illness condition (M = 4.91, SE = 0.18) believed the perpetrator was less responsible than 
participants in both the not mental illness (M = 5.95, SE = 0.18), p < .001, d = -0.74, and 
emotional deficit (M = 5.92, SE = 0.19), p = .001, d = -0.67, conditions.  There were no 
other differences between conditions. 
There was a significant difference across the four conditions in ratings of the 
extent of perpetrator mental illness, F(3, 253) = 7.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .08.  A Games-
Howell post hoc test was conducted as the assumption of homogeneity of variance was 
violated, p < .001.  It was determined that participants in the not mental illness condition 
(M = 4.15, SE = 0.20) believed the perpetrator had a mental illness to a lesser extent than 
participants in both the mental illness (M = 5.05, SE = 0.21), p = .014, d = -0.55, and no  
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Figure 2. Initial ratings of perpetrator responsibility, the extent of perpetrator mental 
illness, the necessity of criminal punishment, and the perpetrator’s NCRMD eligibility, 
NCRMD likelihood, and potential NCRMD success. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
expert (M = 5.49, SE = 0.20), p < .001, d = -0.83, conditions.  There were no other 
differences between conditions. 
There was a significant difference across the four conditions in the extent to 
which participants believed criminal punishment was necessary, F(3, 253) = 4.46, p = 
.005, ηp2 = .05.  A Tukey post hoc test determined that participants in the no expert 
condition (M = 5.31, SE = 0.16) believed criminal punishment was less necessary than 
participants in both the not mental illness (M = 5.97, SE = 0.16), p = .021, d = -0.49, and 
emotional deficit (M = 5.92, SE = 0.17), p = .044, d = -0.46, conditions.  There were no 
other differences between conditions. 
There was a significant difference across the four conditions in the extent to 
which participants believed the perpetrator should be eligible for the NCRMD defence, 
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F(3, 253) = 8.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .09.  A Tukey post hoc test determined that participants 
in the not mental illness condition (M = 2.92, SE = 0.21) believed the perpetrator should 
be less eligible than participants in both the mental illness (M = 3.98, SE = 0.22), p = 
.003, d = -0.64, and no expert (M = 4.02, SE = 0.21), p = .002, d = -0.61, conditions.  
Further, participants in the emotional deficit condition (M = 2.87, SE = 0.22) believed the 
perpetrator should be less eligible than participants in both the mental illness, p = .002, d 
= -0.67, and no expert, p = .001, d = -0.64, conditions.  There were no other differences 
between conditions. 
There was a significant difference across the four conditions in participants’ 
ratings of the likelihood the perpetrator would use the NCRMD defence, F(3, 253) = 
4.89, p = .003, ηp2 = .06.  A Games-Howell post hoc test was conducted as the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated, p < .001.  It was determined that 
participants in the mental illness condition (M = 5.81, SE = 0.20) believed the perpetrator 
would be more likely to use the NCRMD defence than participants in both the not mental 
illness (M = 4.74, SE = 0.20), p = .001, d = 0.68, and emotional deficit (M = 5.10, SE = 
0.21), p = .039, d = 0.49, conditions.  There were no other differences between 
conditions. 
There was a significant difference across the four conditions in how successful 
participants believed the NCRMD defence would be, F(3, 253) = 7.55, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.08.  A Tukey post hoc test determined that participants in the not mental illness 
condition (M = 3.09, SE = 0.20) believed the NCRMD defence would be less successful 
than participants in both the mental illness (M = 4.33, SE = 0.20), p < .001, d = -0.82, and 
no expert (M = 3.87, SE = 0.20), p = .031, d = -0.48, conditions.  Further, participants in 
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the emotional deficit condition (M = 3.33, SE = 0.21) believed the NCRMD defence 
would be less successful than participants in the mental illness condition, p = .003, d = -
0.62.  There were no other differences between conditions. 
There were no significant differences across the four conditions in ratings of 
victim blame. 
Consequence suggestions.  When asked to indicate in an open-ended format the 
consequence they believed the perpetrator discussed in the assigned news article should 
receive, 248 participants provided a response: 110 (44.36%) believed the consequence 
should come from the penal system, 88 (35.48%) believed the consequence should come 
from the mental health court system, 38 (15.32%) believed the consequence should come 
from a combination of both the penal and mental health court systems, and 12 (4.84%) 
indicated that they were unsure of what the consequence should be.  A chi-square 
analysis determined that consequence suggestions varied according to the news article 
that participants read, χ2(9, n = 248) = 29.98, p < .001, ϕ2 = .12 (see Figure 3).  Thus, 
follow-up analyses using additional chi-squares were conducted to determine where the 
specific differences were. 
The percentage of participants who suggested that a suitable consequence should 
come from the penal system differed across condition, χ2(3, n = 110) = 12.40, p = .006, ϕ2 
= .11.  Participants in the not mental illness condition were more likely to suggest a 
consequence from the penal system than participants in both the mental illness, χ2(1, n = 
54) = 8.96, p = .003, ϕ2 = .17, and no expert, χ2(1, n = 59) = 4.90, p = .027, ϕ2 = .08, 
conditions. Participants in the emotional deficit condition were also more likely to 
suggest a consequence from the penal system than participants in the mental illness  
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Figure 3. Distribution of consequence suggestions by condition. 
 
condition, χ2(1, n = 51) = 7.08, p = .008, ϕ2 = .14. 
The percentage of participants who suggested that a suitable consequence should 
come from the mental health court system differed across condition, χ2(3, n = 88) = 
10.46, p = .015, ϕ2 = .12.  Participants in the mental illness condition were more likely to 
suggest a consequence from the mental health court system than participants in both the 
not mental illness, χ2(1, n = 42) = 4.67, p = .031, ϕ2 = .11, and emotional deficit, χ2(1, n = 
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43) = 3.93, p = .047, ϕ2 = .09, conditions.  Participants in the no expert condition were 
also more likely to suggest a consequence from the mental health court system than 
participants in both the not mental illness, χ2(1, n = 45) = 6.42, p = .011, ϕ2 = .14, and 
emotional deficit, χ2(1, n = 46) = 5.57, p = .018, ϕ2 = .12, conditions. 
The percentage of participants who suggested that a suitable consequence should 
come from a combination of both the penal and mental health court systems, χ2(3, n = 38) 
= 2.63, p = .452, ϕ2 = .07, as well as the percentage of participants who indicated that 
they were unsure of what the consequence should be, χ2(3, n = 12) = 4.67, p = .198, ϕ2 = 
.39, did not differ across condition. 
Change in scores.  Mixed ANOVAs were conducted to determine whether there 
were any changes in perceptions (of perpetrator responsibility, the extent of perpetrator 
mental illness, the necessity of criminal punishment, the perpetrator’s NCRMD 
eligibility, NCRMD likelihood, and potential NCRMD success, and victim responsibility) 
after reading a short paragraph about psychopathy (see Table 4 for means and standard 
deviations).  Controlling for initial knowledge of psychopathy, there was a significant 
time by condition interaction in ratings of perpetrator responsibility, F(3, 233) = 3.27, p = 
.022, ηp2 = .04.  Pairwise comparisons determined that participants in the mental illness 
condition believed the perpetrator was more responsible after reading the provided 
psychopathy information (M = 5.58, SE = 0.15) than they did before (M = 4.97, SE = 
0.19), p < .001, d = 0.46. 
There were no other differences in terms of answers to the news article questions 
when comparing ratings before and after the provided psychopathy information.  Further, 
several participants did not provide a suggestion for what they believed an appropriate  
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Table 4. Means and standard deviations for news article questions by condition. 
 Condition 
 Mental illness Not mental illness Emotional deficit No expert 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1. Responsibility         
     Time 1 4.97 1.58 5.92 1.15 6.07 1.22 5.42 1.61 
     Time 2 5.58 1.03 6.02 1.13 6.13 1.17 5.69 1.26 
2. Mental illness         
     Time 1 5.12 1.39 4.20 1.91 4.81 1.95 5.45 1.27 
     Time 2 5.18 1.38 4.18 1.95 4.65 1.99 5.28 1.29 
3. Necessity of punishment         
     Time 1 5.41 1.24 5.91 1.34 6.02 1.25 5.31 1.37 
     Time 2 5.50 1.15 5.88 1.26 5.95 1.32 5.44 1.43 
4. NCRMD eligibility         
     Time 1 4.07 1.58 2.99 1.75 2.89 1.76 3.98 1.80 
     Time 2 4.15 1.52 3.17 1.85 2.89 1.73 4.13 1.66 
5. NCRMD likelihood         
     Time 1 5.91 1.12 4.70 1.94 5.07 1.67 5.24 1.51 
     Time 2 5.74 1.23 4.54 2.01 4.88 1.73 5.29 1.43 
6. NCRMD success         
     Time 1 4.40 1.51 3.05 1.47 3.27 1.75 3.74 1.63 
     Time 2 4.25 1.47 3.00 1.53 3.39 1.71 3.64 1.64 
7. Victim blame         
     Time 1 2.71 2.27 2.37 2.24 2.91 2.39 2.57 2.10 
     Time 2 2.67 2.19 2.27 2.16 2.69 2.37 2.52 2.20 
Note. Mean values control for initial knowledge of psychopathy. 
 
consequence would be when asked for a second time.  Of the participants who did 
provide consequence suggestions for a second time, no pattern of differences emerged.  
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Discussion 
 Though the presence of psychopathy has generally been seen as an aggravating 
factor for sentencing in the past, some researchers are currently arguing that psychopaths 
may actually have valid justification to be considered not criminally responsible for their 
actions (Morse, 2008).  Findings from the present study offer some insight into the 
Canadian public’s perceptions of psychopathy and the notion of criminal responsibility. 
Attitudes Toward the NCRMD Defence 
Overall, participants had a somewhat positive attitude toward the NCRMD 
defence, a finding that was replicated from a recent Canadian study (Power, 2015).  This 
finding indicates support for Hypothesis 1 (i.e., the overall attitude toward the NCRMD 
defence in Canada would be positive).  As previously mentioned, past research 
concerning the insanity defence in the United States suggested a generally negative 
attitude toward the defence at the time (Hans, 1986), leading one to question whether the 
discrepancy between these studies is the result of the different time periods or the 
different geographic locations in which they took place.  Perhaps these contrasting 
findings are due to both of these factors. 
Perceptions of Psychopathy 
Relation to IDA-R.  The more negative participants’ attitudes were toward the 
NCRMD defence in general, the less likely they were to believe that psychopaths should 
be eligible for the defence and the more likely they were to believe that psychopaths are 
responsible for their negative actions.  Since overall attitude toward the defence was not 
related to the belief that psychopathy is a mental illness, these findings suggest that 
negative attitudes toward the defence may be associated with a belief that no person 
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should be eligible for the defence and that people are always criminally responsible for 
their actions.  Hence, people with generally negative attitudes toward the NCRMD 
defence may have indicated that psychopaths should not be eligible for the defence and 
are responsible for their negative actions not because the question was specifically 
referring to psychopaths per say, but because they feel this way about all people.  This 
idea is supported by the fact that several of the questions in the IDA-R address the belief 
that everyone should be punished for committing crimes regardless of the circumstances 
(Skeem et al., 2004).  Thus, it seems to be the case that negative attitudes toward the 
NCRMD defence could largely stem from the more general belief that every person is 
criminally responsible for his or her actions. 
Initial scores.  Overall, participants tended to believe that psychopathy is a 
mental illness, yet psychopaths should not be eligible for the NCRMD defence and are 
still responsible for their negative actions.  A potential explanation for this pattern of 
findings could be that although participants may have believed psychopathy is a mental 
illness, they may not have equated the construct to the mental illnesses commonly seen in 
cases of NCRMD.  To illustrate, perhaps these participants viewed psychopathy as a 
mental illness but not to the same degree as other mental illnesses (e.g., schizophrenia or 
bipolar disorder), resulting in an overall belief that psychopaths should not be eligible for 
the defence and are responsible for their actions.  Alternatively, it is possible that 
participants viewed psychopathy as a mental illness to a similar degree as other mental 
illnesses, but believed psychopaths are more dangerous than individuals with different 
mental illnesses.  As a result, perhaps the belief that psychopaths should not be eligible 
for the NCRMD defence was due to the fact that psychopaths were perceived as too 
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dangerous and untrustworthy to possibly be given the opportunity to be released back 
into the community through absolute and conditional discharges.  In a recent literature 
review, Parcesepe and Cabassa (2013) found that people commonly consider individuals 
with mental illnesses as more dangerous than individuals without such illnesses.  
However, it was also found that ratings of dangerousness tend to differ as a function of 
the specific illness in question such that individuals with some mental illnesses (e.g., 
schizophrenia) are generally seen as more dangerous than individuals with other mental 
illnesses (e.g., depression) (Parcesepe & Cabassa, 2013).  While psychopathy was not a 
condition included in Parcesepe and Cabassa’s (2013) meta-analysis, the idea that 
members of the general public would consider psychopathy as one of the more dangerous 
conditions is certainly probable. 
Change in scores.  Participants in the mental illness condition believed that 
psychopaths should be eligible for the NCRMD defence more strongly after reading the 
news article.  Participants in the not mental illness condition believed that psychopathy is 
a mental illness and psychopaths should be eligible for the NCRMD defence less 
strongly, and that psychopaths are responsible for their negative actions more strongly, 
after reading the news article.  Lastly, participants in the emotional deficit condition 
believed that psychopaths are responsible for their negative actions more strongly after 
reading the news article.  These differences are not surprising as perceived expertise has 
previously been associated with the ability to persuade people into agreement (Bohner et 
al., 2002), and each significant shift was in the direction that corresponded with the 
argument provided by the expert in the assigned news article.  However, it is interesting 
to note that the specific perceptions altered were different for each condition.  That is, 
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participants in the mental illness and emotional deficit conditions experienced a change in 
one perception of psychopathy, albeit the perception that changed was different for each, 
whereas participants in the not mental illness condition experienced a change in all three 
perceptions.  It seems that the specific types of perceptions that are most likely to be 
influenced in any given situation may change as a function of the nature of the argument 
presented.  This is not a novel speculation, as persuasion researchers have long claimed 
that different types of attitudes are influenced in distinct ways depending on the type of 
argument one is exposed to (Millar & Millar, 1990). 
Relation to attitude strength.  For each of the three questions assessing attitudes 
toward psychopathy in relation to criminal responsibility, initial attitude strength, as 
indicated by extremeness, was related to attitude change.  More specifically, stronger 
(i.e., more extreme) initial attitudes were associated with less change after participants 
were presented with the news article, which corresponds with Bassili’s (2008) description 
of the relationship between attitude extremeness and resistance to change.  These findings 
indicate support for Hypothesis 2 (i.e., initial attitude strength would be related to the 
amount of change in said attitude). 
In addition to the above finding, it was determined that the significance of the 
overall relationships was largely driven by the magnitude of the relationships specifically 
in the emotional deficit condition, especially seeing as there was no relationship between 
initial attitude strength and attitude change in either the mental illness or not mental 
illness conditions.  Perhaps this finding suggests that attitude strength is more likely to be 
related to attitude change when there is more leeway in terms of interpreting the 
information provided.  To clarify, the expert in both the mental illness and not mental 
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illness conditions specifically stated whether or not psychopaths should be classified as 
mentally ill, whereas this information was not explicitly stated in the emotional deficit 
condition.  Thus, it is possible that, regardless of initial attitude strength, participants 
were more likely to change their attitudes in accordance with the argument provided 
when the expert made it very clear how psychopaths should be classified (i.e., as 
mentally ill or not).  In contrast, when it was left up to the participants to determine for 
themselves whether they believed psychopathy should be considered a mental illness 
based on information provided by an expert, but not the expert’s specific opinion per say, 
initial attitude strength was related to change in their attitudes. 
It is interesting to note that initial attitude extremeness was related to attitude 
change for one of the specific perceptions of psychopathy in the no expert condition (i.e., 
whether psychopaths should be eligible for the NCRMD defence).  As with the article in 
the emotional deficit condition, there was no specific statement addressing how 
psychopathy should be classified in the no expert condition.  In the no expert condition, 
however, there was no information provided about the construct of psychopathy at all.  
Participants read about the case of a homicide, but the only mention of psychopaths in 
this condition was that the perpetrator was one.  It seems that simply reading about a case 
of a homicide committed by a psychopath was sufficient for participants in the no expert 
condition (who initially had relatively neutral attitudes toward whether psychopaths 
should qualify for the NCRMD defence) to experience an attitude shift.  A possible 
explanation for this finding could be that psychopaths were more likely to be perceived as 
dangerous and impulsive after reading the article, especially considering the fact that the 
victim was a seemingly random stranger to the psychopathic perpetrator and there was no 
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apparent reason for the murder.  Participants in the no expert condition, who were not 
influenced in any way by the opinion of a supposed psychopathy expert, may have 
simply been less likely to agree with the idea that these dangerous and impulsive 
individuals could potentially be acquitted of their heinous acts after being presented with 
an example of one. 
News Article 
Initial scores.  Participants in the mental illness condition believed a) the 
perpetrator was less responsible than participants in both the not mental illness and 
emotional deficit conditions, b) the perpetrator had a mental illness to a greater extent 
than participants in the not mental illness condition, c) the perpetrator should be more 
eligible for the NCRMD defence than participants in both the not mental illness and 
emotional deficit conditions, d) the perpetrator would be more likely to use the NCRMD 
defence than participants in both the not mental illness and emotional deficit conditions, 
and e) the NCRMD defence would be more successful than participants in both the not 
mental illness and emotional deficit conditions. 
In addition to the differences discussed above, participants in the not mental 
illness condition also believed a) the perpetrator had a mental illness to a lesser extent, b) 
criminal punishment was more necessary, c) the perpetrator should be less eligible for the 
NCRMD defence, and d) the NCRMD defence would be less successful than participants 
in the no expert condition. 
Lastly, participants in the emotional deficit condition also believed a) criminal 
punishment was more necessary, and b) the perpetrator should be less eligible for the 
NCRMD defence than participants in the no expert condition. 
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It is not surprising that several differences exist between the participants in the 
mental illness and not mental illness conditions.  In these conditions, the supposed expert 
specifically stated whether or not psychopathy is a mental illness and it was previously 
stated that the perpetrator was a psychopath.  Further, participants were informed of the 
basic requirements for the NCRMD defence (i.e., the presence of a mental illness and the 
inability to understand either the nature and quality of the act performed or the 
wrongfulness of said act; Pozzulo et al., 2015) earlier in the study.  Thus, it is plausible 
that the participants in the mental illness and not mental illness conditions simply used 
the information acquired throughout the study to classify the man as either mentally ill or 
not mentally ill and subsequently determined whether or not the NCRMD defence would 
be appropriate. 
Participants in the emotional deficit condition were not specifically told whether 
or not the perpetrator had a mental illness, so there was arguably a greater capacity for 
interpretation.  That being said, these participants gave similar ratings as the participants 
in the not mental illness condition for the majority of questions.  There is more than one 
possible explanation for this pattern of findings.  While the expert in the emotional deficit 
condition did not provide a statement specifically addressing mental illness, it was stated 
that psychopaths do not have any problem understanding the difference between right and 
wrong.  This statement implies that, in the instance of psychopathy, one of the NCRMD 
requirements (i.e., the inability to understand the wrongfulness of the act performed) is 
essentially violated.  Hence, participants in the emotional deficit condition may have 
provided ratings similar to participants in the not mental illness condition because in 
neither case did the perpetrator meet the basic requirements for the consideration of being 
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deemed not criminally responsible.  Alternatively, perhaps being informed that 
psychopaths are not cognitively impaired even though they characteristically lack guilt 
and shame resulted in the perpetrator being perceived as not only fully responsible for his 
actions, but as a particularly dangerous individual in general.  These perceptions could 
have contributed to the belief that the NCRMD defence would not be appropriate, which 
would help to explain the similarities in ratings between participants in the emotional 
deficit and not mental illness conditions. 
Another noteworthy finding is the generally similar ratings between participants 
in the mental illness and no expert conditions.  In fact, in no instance was there a 
significant difference between the ratings in these two conditions.  Recall the previously 
discussed finding that psychopathy was generally believed to be a mental illness.  The 
similarities between ratings of participants in the mental illness and no expert conditions 
could be interpreted as further evidence to support the notion that people may tend to 
believe that psychopathy is a mental illness unless, perhaps, they are provided with 
evidence to suggest otherwise (e.g., being exposed to an expert’s opinion on the matter). 
Consequence suggestions.  Participants in the mental illness condition were more 
likely to suggest a consequence from the mental health court system, and less likely to 
suggest a consequence from the penal system, than participants in both the not mental 
illness and emotional deficit conditions.  In addition, participants in the not mental illness 
condition were more likely to suggest a consequence from the penal system, and less 
likely to suggest a consequence from the mental health court system, than participants in 
the no expert condition.  Lastly, participants in the emotional deficit condition were less 
likely to suggest a consequence from the mental health court system than participants in 
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the no expert condition. 
As with the answers to the previously discussed news article questions, 
consequence suggestions largely, and unsurprisingly, corresponded with the arguments 
presented in the article to which participants were assigned.  In addition, the same 
aforementioned similarities between conditions were generally found.  That is, 
participants in the not mental illness and emotional deficit conditions provided a similar 
pattern of consequence suggestions and participants in the mental illness and no expert 
conditions provided a similar pattern of consequence suggestions. 
Change in scores.  After reading the provided psychopathy information, 
participants in the mental illness condition believed the perpetrator was more responsible 
than they originally had.  This was the only difference in how the event described in the 
news article was perceived when comparing the ratings before and after the psychopathy 
information was provided.  It seems that being presented with information about the 
construct of psychopathy was not an overly effective way to influence how the event was 
perceived, seeing as ratings for the majority of questions did not change.  That being said, 
the fact that the information did have an effect on participants in the mental illness 
condition should not be ignored.  These participants had originally believed the 
perpetrator was less responsible than participants in both the not mental illness and 
emotional deficit conditions, likely due in part to the expert quote they were presented 
with.  After reading the provided psychopathy information, however, ratings of 
perpetrator responsibility increased to levels more similar to that of the other conditions.  
Hence, perhaps learning more about the construct of psychopathy has the potential to, in 
a sense, undo some of the effect of being presented with the argument that psychopathy is 
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a mental illness and that engaging in violent behaviours is not a psychopath’s fault. 
Implications 
A straightforward implication of the present research is that members of the 
Canadian general public may have a somewhat positive view of the NCRMD defence.  If 
the majority of Canadians agree with the notion of deeming certain individuals not 
criminally responsible and are satisfied with the system that is currently in place, perhaps 
bills that aim to alter this system in potentially detrimental ways, as was the case with 
Bill C-14, will not be approved or enacted so readily in the future.  Present findings also 
imply that it may be the case that Canadians generally believe psychopathy is a mental 
illness, yet psychopaths should still be ineligible for the NCRMD defence as they are 
seen as responsible for their actions.  While it is certainly possible that the public belief 
that psychopathy is a mental illness could impact the types of bills that appear in the 
future, the general belief that psychopaths should not be eligible for the NCRMD defence 
will presumably make the actual enactment of these bills less likely. 
Findings from the present study also have direct implications for the influence of 
the media.  Participants’ perceptions of psychopathy were altered through the 
presentation of fictional news articles and expert opinions, highlighting the question of to 
what extent the public’s perceptions can be influenced if the researchers who argue that 
psychopaths should not be considered criminally responsible become more publically 
outspoken with these arguments.  However, ratings of perpetrator responsibility in the 
mental illness condition increased after participants were presented with a short 
description of psychopathy.  This particular finding implies that acquiring accurate 
knowledge about psychopathy may help to negate the influence of the arguments for 
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deeming psychopaths not criminally responsible. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 A noteworthy limitation of the present study is the uneven distributions of both 
participant age and sex.  More specifically, the majority of participants were young adult 
women.  As there were not enough men or older adults in the current sample to run the 
appropriate analyses, it was decided that examining any age and/or sex differences across 
the key study variables would be ill-advised, despite the fact that determining if and 
where these differences exist would admittedly provide valuable information.  By 
identifying any differences in perceptions across these basic demographic variables, it 
would be easier to identify specific groups that could particularly benefit from learning 
more about the NCRMD defence as well as the construct of psychopathy.  Hence, future 
research examining perceptions of criminal responsibility and psychopathy should aim to 
use a more diverse sample in order to determine if differences exist as a function of these 
demographic variables. 
A second limitation of the present study is the fact that only Hare’s (2003) 
conceptualization of psychopathy was discussed in the provided psychopathy information 
when there are, in fact, numerous conceptualizations that different researchers adhere to.  
Public perceptions of psychopathy may be more likely swayed by one conceptualization 
than another for any number of reasons, so perhaps it would be beneficial to examine if 
this is the case by randomly presenting participants with one of several psychopathy 
paragraphs as opposed to presenting the same information to all participants.  It would 
undoubtedly be worthwhile to determine whether researchers from different camps are 
more or less able to alter public perceptions of psychopathy. 
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 A third limitation of the present study is the generally high scores on the 
knowledge of psychopathy measure.  Approximately 91% of participants correctly 
answered a minimum of 10 of the 20 questions and approximately 50% of participants 
correctly answered a minimum of 15.  The measure may not have been able to truly 
distinguish between participants with and without an adequate psychopathy knowledge 
base seeing as most participants were able to correctly answer the majority of questions.  
Thus, knowledge of psychopathy was treated solely as a covariate when examining the 
effect of the provided psychopathy information as it was deemed unwise to focus on 
knowledge of psychopathy as a key variable in other analyses.  As a result, it may be 
advantageous to construct a measure that includes more challenging and discriminating 
questions if one were to examine knowledge of psychopathy as a variable of interest in 
future studies. 
 In order to acquire a deeper understanding of the public’s perceptions, future 
research should attempt to tease apart some of the results of the present study, as there are 
various explanations that could be applied to some of the findings.  For example, it was 
previously discussed that participants in the emotional deficit condition seemed to 
perceive the case described in the news article in a similar manner as participants in the 
not mental illness condition.  This finding could be because participants in the emotional 
deficit condition did not consider psychopathy a mental illness or because they simply 
believed the perpetrator was a threat to public safety.  However, in order to determine the 
actual reasoning behind the perceptions of participants in the emotional deficit condition, 
additional research would need to specifically address this question.  Perhaps participants 
could be specifically asked in future studies to indicate how dangerous or threatening 
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they believed the perpetrator to be.  Alternatively, the seriousness of the offence could be 
manipulated as a way of influencing perceived dangerousness.  Thus, if it were to be 
determined that participants in the emotional deficit condition provided similar ratings to 
participants in the not mental illness condition even when the offence was much less 
severe, it would be unlikely that perceived dangerousness of the perpetrator in the 
emotional deficit condition was the mechanism behind the similar ratings. 
Closely related to the previous suggestion, it might also be interesting to vary the 
nature of the offence in future research due to the fact that the illegal act described in the 
present study (i.e., homicide) is, in fact, one of the least common offences seen in cases 
of NCRMD (Miladinovic & Lukassen, 2014).  It is possible that the public may perceive 
the perpetrator quite differently based on the severity of his or her illegal act(s).  Thus, 
presenting the case of a person charged with assault or uttering threats could potentially 
result in findings that are more ecologically valid and applicable to the real world, as 
these offences tend to be much more common in actual cases of NCRMD (Miladinovic & 
Lukassen, 2014). 
It may also be important to disentangle the reasoning behind the ratings of 
participants in the mental illness condition in the present study.  Unsurprisingly, answers 
to the news article questions provided by these participants largely corresponded with the 
argument that psychopathy is a mental illness (e.g., ratings of perpetrator responsibility 
were relatively low; ratings of NCRMD eligibility and potential NCRMD success were 
relatively high).  In this condition, however, it was specifically stated that psychopaths 
have physical brain differences.  Thus, the argument was largely based on neurobiology.  
This seemingly minor detail could have had a major impact on participant ratings.  For 
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instance, it is possible that participants may not have perceived the perpetrator how they 
did based on the fact that the expert explicitly stated psychopathy is a mental illness, but 
because he specifically referred to the fact that psychopaths have neurobiological 
abnormalities.  Perhaps referring to these physical brain differences resulted in 
participants being more likely to adhere to the idea that psychopathy is, in fact, a mental 
illness.  This idea is supported by Rendell, Huss, and Jensen’s (2010) finding that a mock 
jury was more likely to deem a defendant diagnosed with schizophrenia not criminally 
responsible by reason of insanity when the arguments presented by an expert witness 
were biological, as opposed to psychological, in nature.  Though the present study 
focuses on psychopathy rather than schizophrenia, it is certainly possible that biological 
arguments may be more likely than psychological arguments to persuade people to deem 
defendants not criminally responsible in a variety of circumstances.  Alternatively, 
perhaps the inclusion of the neurobiological argument in the quote in this particular 
instance did not have a large impact on participants’ perceptions and the crucial factor 
driving these perceptions was actually the simple fact that the expert definitively stated 
that psychopathy is a mental illness.  Again, additional research is required to better 
understand why exactly perceptions of participants in the mental illness condition were 
affected in the ways that they were. 
As previously discussed, mental disorder is a legal term defined as a “disease of 
the mind” (Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c.46, s.2, p. 8) encompassing any condition that 
impairs the mind, with a few aforementioned exceptions.  Thus, it is a broad term that 
includes, but is not limited to, mental illnesses.  However, the term mental illness was 
used at several points throughout the survey as mental illness and mental disorder are 
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often used interchangeably in the field of psychology.  That being said, researchers have 
not specifically addressed whether or not these terms might influence participants’ 
perceptions in different ways.  For example, one term could be perceived as more 
positive or negative than the other, which could have an effect on participants’ ratings.  
Alternatively, the terms could simply be perceived differently such that participants may 
be more likely to believe a given condition is a mental disorder than they are to believe it 
is a mental illness (or vice versa) without one term being perceived as necessarily more 
positive or negative than the other.  Hence, it may be informative to investigate how these 
terms are perceived and whether they have any impact on participants’ ratings, especially 
as these terms will undoubtedly be used in public opinion research in the future. 
One might also choose to include additional demographic variables in future 
studies in order to make comparisons between groups that extend beyond age and sex.  
For example, it may be a good idea to ask about past experience, either personally or 
professionally, with mental illness, mentally ill offenders, and/or psychopathy, as it is 
likely that people with such experience would perceive the issue of criminal 
responsibility differently than those without. 
 Lastly, it may be valuable to conduct studies similar to the present in various 
geographic locations in order to compare perceptions of the defences pertaining to 
mentally ill offenders across different regions.  As previously discussed, research 
conducted in the United States in the mid-1980s suggested that the general attitude 
toward the insanity defence was negative at the time (Hans, 1986).  Seeing as the general 
attitude toward the NCRMD defence in Canada is currently suggested to be positive, it 
would be interesting to examine whether current American attitudes are similarly 
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positive.  On the contrary, perhaps American attitudes toward the insanity defence are 
still negative.  Making these comparisons would help to determine whether attitudes 
toward these defences have shifted over time, differ across locations, or both.  Exploring 
these attitudes in regions other than Canada and the United States would surely provide 
meaningful information as well. 
Conclusion 
 The findings of the present study suggest that, in general, members of the 
Canadian public do not believe psychopaths should be eligible for the NCRMD defence 
and that they are responsible for their actions, even though it seems that psychopathy is 
generally considered to be a mental illness.  However, findings specific to the questions 
based on the news article highlight the fact that researchers may be able to alter these 
perceptions through publicizing their arguments in popular media.  Due to the inherent 
relationship between public opinion and law, one should not underestimate the potential 
impact researchers can have on law and policy change through first targeting public 
opinion.  That being said, the present study provides preliminary evidence that simply 
educating the public on the construct of psychopathy may help to reduce the influence of 
the current arguments for removing a psychopath’s criminal responsibility.  
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Appendix A: 
Online Advertisement 
 
Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility Questionnaire 
 
Looking for Canadians 18 years of age and older who are able to read and comprehend 
English fluently. Participants will be asked to answer several questions about themselves 
as well as their beliefs about psychopathy and mentally ill offenders. Participants will 
also read a short news article and answer questions regarding the story. 
 
Takes about 30 minutes. 
 
Participants will enter a draw for a chance to win a $100 Tim Horton’s gift card. 
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Appendix B: 
Informed Consent Page 
 
Project Title: Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility Questionnaire 
  
Principal Student Investigator: 
Jordan Power, MA student 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University (Ontario, Canada) 
jp14ch@brocku.ca 
  
Principal Investigator: 
Dr. Angela Book, Associate Professor 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University (Ontario, Canada) 
abook@brocku.ca 
  
INVITATION 
You are invited to participate in a study. The purpose of this study is to investigate 
people’s perceptions of psychopathy and criminal responsibility.  
  
WHAT’S INVOLVED 
As a participant, you will be asked to answer several questions about yourself. You will 
then answer questions about your opinions and beliefs about psychopathy and mentally ill 
offenders. You will also read a short news article and answer several questions regarding 
the story. Participation will take approximately 30 minutes. 
  
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS 
Aside from the chance to win a $100 gift card for Tim Horton’s, participants will learn 
about psychopathy and the not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder 
(NCRMD) defence. The researchers will benefit from a greater understanding of how the 
Canadian general public perceives psychopathy and criminal responsibility. There may 
be risks associated with participation, as you might become uncomfortable due to the 
nature of the news article. However, such emotional discomfort is expected to be no 
greater than that experienced in everyday life by watching the news or reading a 
newspaper. 
  
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information you provide is considered confidential; your name will not be included 
with your responses or in any other way associated with the data collected in the study. 
Furthermore, because our interest is in the average responses of the entire group of 
participants, you will not be identified individually in any way in written reports of this 
research. Data collected during this study will be stored for seven years on a password-
protected computer in the forensic psychology laboratory at Brock University. Access to 
these data will be restricted to the two principal investigators in this study, Jordan Power 
(MA student) and Dr. Angela Book. Please note the Qualtrics is based in the United 
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States and therefore is subjected to American Homeland Security laws such as the Patriot 
Act. 
  
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you wish, you may decline to answer any 
questions or participate in any component of the study. Further, you may decide to 
withdraw from this study at any time. Please note that once the questionnaires are 
completed they are anonymous and therefore impossible to remove from the data should 
you wish to withdraw after completing your participation. 
  
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS 
Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at 
conferences. Feedback about this study will be available after September 2017. 
Participants who wish to receive information about the findings of this study at that time 
can email jp14ch@brocku.ca or abook@brocku.ca to receive a document outlining the 
results. 
  
CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE 
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact 
Jordan Power or Dr. Angela Book using the contact information provided above. This 
study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board 
at Brock University [REB 16-013]. If you have any comments or concerns about your 
rights as a research participant, please contact the Brock University Research Ethics 
Office at (905) 688-5550 ext. 3035, reb@brocku.ca. 
  
Thank you for your assistance in this project. If you like, you can print off a copy of this 
page for your records. 
 
CONSENT 
Please check off one of the boxes below: 
 
I agree to participate in this study described above. I have made this decision based 
on the information I have read in this Information Consent Letter. I have the 
opportunity to receive additional details and ask further questions by contacting the 
researchers or the Brock University Research Ethics Office. I understand that I may 
withdraw this consent at any time by simply exiting the questionnaire before I am 
finished. 
 
I do not want to participate in this study and wish to exit the questionnaire now. 
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Appendix C: 
Online Survey 
On which website did you see the advertisement for this study (e.g., Kijiji, Reddit, etc.)? 
[Open-ended] 
 
To be entered into the draw for a chance to win a $100 Tim Horton’s gift card, and to 
receive a debriefing email once data collection for this study has ended, please provide 
your email address here: [Open-ended] 
 
Please note that your email address will not be associated with your responses. Further, 
all email addresses collected will be disposed of once the draw has been made and the 
winner has been contacted. 
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What is your age in years? [Open-ended] 
What is your biological sex? [Open-ended] 
What is the highest level of education you have received? [Open-ended] 
What is your country of residence? [Open-ended]  
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Please read each statement about yourself and decide how much you agree or disagree 
with that statement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
 
1. I would be quite bored by a visit to an art gallery. 
2. I plan ahead and organize things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute. 
3. I rarely hold a grudge, even against people who have badly wronged me. 
4. I feel reasonably satisfied with myself overall. 
5. I would feel afraid if I had to travel in bad weather conditions. 
6. I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would 
succeed. 
7. I'm interested in learning about the history and politics of other countries. 
8. I often push myself very hard when trying to achieve a goal. 
9. People sometimes tell me that I am too critical of others. 
10. I rarely express my opinions in group meetings. 
11. I sometimes can't help worrying about little things. 
12. If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars. 
13. I would enjoy creating a work of art, such as a novel, a song, or a painting. 
14. When working on something, I don't pay much attention to small details. 
15. People sometimes tell me that I'm too stubborn. 
16. I prefer jobs that involve active social interaction to those that involve working alone. 
17. When I suffer from a painful experience, I need someone to make me feel 
comfortable. 
18. Having a lot of money is not especially important to me. 
19. I think that paying attention to radical ideas is a waste of time. 
20. I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought. 
21. People think of me as someone who has a quick temper. 
22. On most days, I feel cheerful and optimistic. 
23. I feel like crying when I see other people crying. 
24. I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is. 
25. If I had the opportunity, I would like to attend a classical music concert. 
26. When working, I sometimes have difficulties due to being disorganized. 
27. My attitude toward people who have treated me badly is “forgive and forget”. 
28. I feel that I am an unpopular person. 
29. When it comes to physical danger, I am very fearful. 
30. If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person's worst jokes. 
31. I’ve never really enjoyed looking through an encyclopedia. 
32. I do only the minimum amount of work needed to get by.  
33. I tend to be lenient in judging other people. 
34. In social situations, I’m usually the one who makes the first move. 
35. I worry a lot less than most people do. 
36. I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large. 
37. People have often told me that I have a good imagination. 
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38. I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense of time. 
39. I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me. 
40. The first thing that I always do in a new place is to make friends. 
41. I can handle difficult situations without needing emotional support from anyone else. 
42. I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods. 
43. I like people who have unconventional views. 
44. I make a lot of mistakes because I don’t think before I act. 
45. Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do. 
46. Most people are more upbeat and dynamic than I generally am. 
47. I feel strong emotions when someone close to me is going away for a long time. 
48. I want people to know that I am an important person of high status. 
49. I don’t think of myself as the artistic or creative type. 
50. People often call me a perfectionist. 
51. Even when people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative. 
52. I sometimes feel that I am a worthless person. 
53. Even in an emergency I wouldn’t feel like panicking. 
54. I wouldn’t pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me. 
55. I find it boring to discuss philosophy. 
56. I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather than stick to a plan. 
57. When people tell me that I’m wrong, my first reaction is to argue with them. 
58. When I’m in a group of people, I’m often the one who speaks on behalf of the group. 
59. I remain unemotional even in situations where most people get very sentimental. 
60. I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it. 
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To the best of your knowledge, please indicate whether each statement about psychopaths 
is true or false. 
 
1. Psychopaths purposely flatter people to get them on their side. 
2. Psychopaths are more tough-minded than other people. 
3. Psychopaths are rebellious people. 
4. Psychopaths are not likely to try to force someone to have sex. 
5. Psychopaths are not tricky or sly. 
6. It tortures psychopaths to see an injured animal. 
7. Psychopaths enjoy doing wild things. 
8. Psychopaths are not likely to attack someone with the idea of injuring them. 
9. Psychopaths would get a kick out of ‘scamming’ someone. 
10. Psychopaths feel sorry when they see a homeless person. 
11. Psychopaths don’t enjoy gambling for real money. 
12. Psychopaths are likely to take hard drugs (e.g., heroin, cocaine). 
13. Psychopaths find it difficult to manipulate people. 
14. Psychopaths love violent sports and movies. 
15. Psychopaths don’t enjoy taking risks. 
16. Psychopaths are not likely to shoplift from a store. 
17. Psychopaths would never step on others to get what they want. 
18. Psychopaths never feel guilty over hurting others. 
19. Psychopaths easily get bored. 
20. Psychopaths are likely to threaten people into giving them money, clothes, or 
makeup.  
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In Canada, the not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) 
defence can be used to remove the responsibility of an individual who did something that 
would otherwise be considered criminal. In order to be considered for the defence, the 
defendant must have a mental illness, the mental illness must be deemed severe enough 
to impact the defendant’s knowledge of the nature and quality of the act performed, and 
the defendant must also have been unaware of the wrongfulness of said act at the time it 
was performed. 
 
After reading each statement, please select the number on the scale that comes closest to 
saying how much you agree or disagree with the statement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
disagree 
Neutral Slightly 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
 
1. I believe that people should be held responsible for their actions no matter what their 
mental condition. 
 
2. I believe that all human beings know what they are doing and have the power to 
control themselves. 
 
3. The NCRMD defence threatens public safety by telling criminals that they can get 
away with a crime if they come up with a good story about why they did it. 
 
4. I believe that mental illness can impair people’s ability to make logical choices and 
control themselves. 
 
5. A defendant’s degree of mental disorder is irrelevant: if the person commits the crime, 
then that person should do the time. 
 
6. The NCRMD defence returns disturbed, dangerous people to the streets. 
 
7. Mentally ill defendants who plead NCRMD have failed to exert enough willpower to 
behave properly like the rest of us. So, they should be punished for their crimes like 
everyone else. 
 
8. As a last resort, defence attorneys will encourage their clients to act strangely and lie 
through their teeth in order to appear mentally disordered. 
 
9. Killers without mental disorder can get away with their crimes by hiring high-priced 
lawyers and experts who misuse the NCRMD defence. 
 
10. The NCRMD defence is a loophole in the law that allows too many guilty people to 
escape punishment. 
 
	 72 
	
11. We should punish people who commit criminal acts, regardless of their degree of 
mental disturbance. 
 
12. It is wrong to punish people who commit crimes while gripped by uncontrollable 
hallucinations or delusions. 
 
13. Most defendants who use the NCRMD defence are truly mentally ill, not fakers. 
 
14. Some people with severe mental illness are out of touch with reality and do not 
understand that their acts are wrong. These people cannot be blamed and do not deserve 
to be punished. 
 
15. Many of the criminals that psychiatrists see fit to return to the streets go on to kill 
again. 
 
16. With slick attorneys and a sad story, any criminal can use the NCRMD defence to 
finagle his or her way to freedom. 
 
17. It is wrong to punish someone for an act they commit because of any uncontrollable 
illness, whether it be epilepsy or mental illness. 
 
18. I believe that we should punish a person for a criminal act only if that person 
understood the act as evil and then freely chose to do it. 
 
19. For the right price, psychiatrists will probably manufacture a “mental illness” for any 
criminal to convince the jury that he or she is mentally disordered. 
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[The following questions were asked once before and once after the news article was 
presented.] 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 
1. Psychopathy is a mental illness. 
 
Strongly disagree   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Strongly agree 
 
 
2. Psychopaths should be eligible for the NCRMD defence. 
 
Strongly disagree   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Strongly agree 
 
 
3. Psychopaths are responsible for their negative actions. 
 
Strongly disagree   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Strongly agree 
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[The following questions were asked once before and once after psychopathy information 
was provided.] 
 
Please answer the following questions based on the news article. 
 
1. How responsible is the perpetrator for what he did? 
 
Not at all responsible   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completely responsible 
 
 
2. To what extent do you think the perpetrator has a mental illness? 
 
Not at all   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completely 
 
 
3. To what extent is criminal punishment necessary? 
 
Not at all necessary   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completely necessary 
 
 
4. What would a suitable consequence be? [Open-ended] 
 
 
5. To what extent should the perpetrator be eligible for the NCRMD defence?  
 
Not at all eligible   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completely eligible 
 
 
6. What is the likelihood that the perpetrator will use the NCRMD defence? 
 
Not at all likely   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Extremely likely 
 
 
7. How successful do you think the NCRMD defence would be in this case? 
 
Not at all successful   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completely successful 
 
 
8. How responsible is the victim for what happened? 
 
Not at all responsible   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completely responsible 
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Appendix D: 
News Articles 
 
Condition A: Mental illness 
 
 
 
 
  
Brandon King, 24, dies in downtown Toronto homicide 
 
Man taken into custody, police say 
 
By Charlotte Byrne, CBC News     Posted: Aug 1, 2016 2:38 PM ET     |     Last Updated: Aug 3, 2016 5:52 PM ET 
 
Toronto police have charged 31-year-old Spencer Hutchings with first-degree murder in relation to a 
man’s death. 
 
Brandon King was found dead in an undisclosed parking lot in downtown Toronto on the morning of 
July 29. It has since been confirmed that the cause of death was strangulation. Security cameras from 
a nearby facility captured Hutchings approach and attack the 24-year-old on the evening of July 28. 
Police believe the altercation occurred as King was returning to his vehicle after leaving work. No 
indication of a previous connection between the two men has been found. 
 
Hutchings was subjected to a full psychological assessment once taken into custody. Experts have 
classified the man as a psychopath. 
 
Dr. Joseph Prescott is a leading investigator of psychopathy. He comments, “Just as with someone 
experiencing schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, it is not a psychopath’s fault that he or she was born 
with that particular mental illness. Psychopaths have physical brain differences and any violent 
behaviours they may exhibit is the result of these differences.” 
 
Hutchings is expected to make his first court appearance later this month. 
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Condition B: Not mental illness 
 
  
Brandon King, 24, dies in downtown Toronto homicide 
 
Man taken into custody, police say 
 
By Charlotte Byrne, CBC News     Posted: Aug 1, 2016 2:38 PM ET     |     Last Updated: Aug 3, 2016 5:52 PM ET 
 
Toronto police have charged 31-year-old Spencer Hutchings with first-degree murder in relation to a 
man’s death. 
 
Brandon King was found dead in an undisclosed parking lot in downtown Toronto on the morning of 
July 29. It has since been confirmed that the cause of death was strangulation. Security cameras from 
a nearby facility captured Hutchings approach and attack the 24-year-old on the evening of July 28. 
Police believe the altercation occurred as King was returning to his vehicle after leaving work. No 
indication of a previous connection between the two men has been found. 
 
Hutchings was subjected to a full psychological assessment once taken into custody. Experts have 
classified the man as a psychopath. 
 
Dr. Joseph Prescott is a leading investigator of psychopathy. He comments, “Psychopathy is not a 
mental illness and cannot be compared to conditions such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. 
Though psychopaths are at a greater risk of exhibiting violent behaviours, these behaviours are not 
predetermined and, most importantly, are not out of their control.” 
 
Hutchings is expected to make his first court appearance later this month. 
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Condition C: Emotional deficit 
 
  
Brandon King, 24, dies in downtown Toronto homicide 
 
Man taken into custody, police say 
 
By Charlotte Byrne, CBC News     Posted: Aug 1, 2016 2:38 PM ET     |     Last Updated: Aug 3, 2016 5:52 PM ET 
 
Toronto police have charged 31-year-old Spencer Hutchings with first-degree murder in relation to a 
man’s death. 
 
Brandon King was found dead in an undisclosed parking lot in downtown Toronto on the morning of 
July 29. It has since been confirmed that the cause of death was strangulation. Security cameras from 
a nearby facility captured Hutchings approach and attack the 24-year-old on the evening of July 28. 
Police believe the altercation occurred as King was returning to his vehicle after leaving work. No 
indication of a previous connection between the two men has been found. 
 
Hutchings was subjected to a full psychological assessment once taken into custody. Experts have 
classified the man as a psychopath. 
 
Dr. Joseph Prescott is a leading investigator of psychopathy. He comments, “While psychopaths may 
not have the emotional capacity to feel guilt or shame for their actions, they do not lack the cognitive 
ability to understand what is right and what is wrong.” 
 
Hutchings is expected to make his first court appearance later this month. 
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Condition D: No expert 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Brandon King, 24, dies in downtown Toronto homicide 
 
Man taken into custody, police say 
 
By Charlotte Byrne, CBC News     Posted: Aug 1, 2016 2:38 PM ET     |     Last Updated: Aug 3, 2016 5:52 PM ET 
 
Toronto police have charged 31-year-old Spencer Hutchings with first-degree murder in relation to a 
man’s death. 
 
Brandon King was found dead in an undisclosed parking lot in downtown Toronto on the morning of 
July 29. It has since been confirmed that the cause of death was strangulation. Security cameras from 
a nearby facility captured Hutchings approach and attack the 24-year-old on the evening of July 28. 
Police believe the altercation occurred as King was returning to his vehicle after leaving work. No 
indication of a previous connection between the two men has been found. 
 
Hutchings was subjected to a full psychological assessment once taken into custody. Experts have 
classified the man as a psychopath. 
 
Hutchings is expected to make his first court appearance later this month. 
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Appendix E: 
Provided Psychopathy Information 
 
While there is no universally agreed upon definition of psychopathy, most psychologists 
agree that it is a condition characterized by several traits, including lack of empathy, 
manipulativeness, impulsiveness, and frequently engaging in criminal behaviour. Not 
only have psychopaths been found to have a drastically negative impact on work 
productivity, interpersonal relationships, and various other aspects of society, they also 
engage in high rates of violent crime, including homicide. 
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Appendix F: 
Debriefing Page 
 
THE NEWS STORY YOU READ WAS FICTIONAL. 
THE EVENTS DEPICTED IN THE STORY DID NOT ACTUALLY HAPPEN. 
 
Project Title: Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility Questionnaire 
 
Principal Student Investigator: 
Jordan Power, MA student 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University (Ontario, Canada) 
jp14ch@brocku.ca 
  
Principal Investigator: 
Dr. Angela Book, Associate Professor of Psychology 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University (Ontario, Canada) 
abook@brocku.ca 
  
Research Feedback 
  
Dear Participant, 
  
Thank you very much for participating in this study. The general purpose of this research 
is to examine people’s opinions of whether or not psychopathy is a mental illness and 
what this means in terms of a psychopath’s criminal responsibility. We would also like to 
determine whether certain factors, such as knowledge of psychopathy, general attitudes 
toward the not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) defence, 
or certain personality characteristics influence such opinions. Near the end of the study, 
you were assigned to read one of four fictional news articles, all of which were identical 
with the exception of an expert’s opinion regarding psychopathy and criminal 
responsibility (the news articles in three of the conditions contained a quote from a 
fictional researcher, each with a different argument; one of the conditions did not contain 
a quote). The inclusion of the four conditions will allow us to examine how easily 
people's attitudes can be altered as a result of being exposed to different expert opinions 
on the intersection of psychopathy and criminal responsibility. 
  
Now that we have more fully explained this research to you, we must ask you to please 
avoid telling anyone else about the details of this study and its purpose, if that person is 
also likely to take part in the study. Doing so may jeopardize the results because people 
might respond differently when knowing the research goals. This is why we did not tell 
you everything about this research until after you had completed this study. 
  
If participation in the study has resulted in distress of any kind, you are encouraged to use 
an online search engine such as Google to find a local crisis counselling service. If you 
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do not have access to crisis counselling or a therapist, please consult your physician for a 
referral. 
  
If you have any other questions or concerns, please feel free to contact the investigators. 
Results will be available after September 2017. We can only provide group averages and 
overall results, not personal information, because all data will remain confidential. 
  
If you like, you can print off a copy of this page for your records. Thank you again for 
your participation! 
